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RECENT DECISIONS
AD!IIRALTY-AGENCY-ToRT LIABILITY OF GENERAL AGENT FOR INJURIES SUSTAINED UPON GOVERNIENT OWNED VESSEL.-The plaintiff, a longshoreman and

employee of a stevedoring contractor, was injured while working on a steamship,
owned by the United States, then moored at a New York City pier. The accident
was caused by the breaking of a defective cargo boom which was part of the ship's
gear. Defendants had, by the terms of a "General Agency Contract" been appointed
agents "to manage and conduct the business of" the vessel and the plaintiff contended that they were so much in possession and control of the ship as to make
them responsible to third persons lawfully on board for injuries caused by unsafe
conditions thereon. The Appellate Division reversed a judgment for the plaintiff
and dismissed the complaint. Upon appeal, leld, judgment affirmed. Caldarola v.
Moore-McCormrack Lines, Inc. et al., 295 N. Y. 463, 68 N. E. (2d) 444 (1946).
In reaching its decision the court distinguished the case of Hest v. Moore-McCorinack.1 In that case the same general agency agreement 2 existed between the
defendant and the government. The plaintiff, a seaman, sued under the Jones Acto
for injuries sustained in falling down an unguarded hatchway while the ship was
being towed. The Supreme Court of Oregon denied recovery, 4 holding that the defendant was an agent of the government for limited purposes only, not 'including
control and authority over the master and crew, and was not the employer of the
plaintiff, a condition precedent to recovery under the Jones Act. The Supreme Court
1. 328 U. S. 707 (1946).
2. The important details of the agency agreement are set forth in 176 Ore. 662, 158
P. (2d) 276, 277 (1945). Briefly, the defendants were appointed agents ". . . to manage
and conduct the business of vessels assigned to it by the United States. . ." They
agreed to ". . . equip, victual, supply and maintain the vessels. . ." They further agreed
". .. to procure the Master of each vessel operated thereunder, subject to the approval of the United States." The master was to be an agent and employee of the United
States and was to have and exercise full control, responsibility and authority with respect to the navigatidn and management of the vessel. The defendants were also to
"...
procure and make available to the Master, for engagement by him, the officers and
men required by him to fill the complement of the vessel."
3. The Merchant Marine Act of June 5, 1920, § 33, 41 STAT. 1007 (1920), 46 U. S. C. §
688 (1940). This Act gave the seaman a cause of action in negligence against his employer
and adopted for seamen the equivalent iights and liabilities conferred upon railroad employees by the Federal Employers Liability Act, 35 STAT. 65 (1908), 45 U. S. C. § 51
et seq. (1940). In general the Jones Act abolishes the defense of the fellow servant doctrine as it had been applied under the general maritime law and gave an injured seaman
the right to sue his employer for negligent acts of the master or fellow crew members or
for negligence resulting in any defect or insufficiency of the vessel or its equipment. The
seaman has been considered to have the advantage of this Act only against his employer.
Nolan v. General Sea Foods Corp., 112 F. (2d) 515 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940); The Norland,
101 F. (2d) 967 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939); Baker v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 57 F.
Supp. 207 (N. D. Cal. 1944); Eggleston v. Republic Steel Corp., 47 F. Supp. 658 (W. D.
N. Y. 1942); Gardner v. Agwilines, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 348 (E. D. N. Y. 1939). See Sicracki v. Seas Shipping Co., 149 F. (2d) 98 (C. C. A. 3d, 1945).
4. 176 Ore. 662, 158 P. (2d) 275 (1946).
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of the United States, despite a vigorous dissent,5 reversed and held the defendants
liable.
The New York Court of Appeals in the principal case takes the position that
the majority opinion in the Hust case holds only that the Jones Act should be liberally construed so as to give the injured seaman a cause of action thereunder against
the General Agent.0 The validity of this interpretation is at least questionable. It
is true that there is in the majority opinion in the Hust case much to support this
interpretation. That case was, of course, brought under the Jones Act, and the
court in reaching its decision was expressly concerned with the protection and furtherance of the traditional status and rights of the seaman.7 The purposes and spirit
of the Clarification Acts weighed heavily in the minds of the majority, and there
was an expressed unwillingness to be bound by the common law rules of agency
or the common law tests for ascertaining the responsibilities of the employer for
the tortious conduct of an employee.0
There is, however, a great deal which militates against such a narrow interpretation. In the present case the New York court finds nothing in the record to prove
possession and control of the ship in the defendants o and refuses to follow the concurring opinion in the Hust case"l which construed the same General Agency agreement as giving the agent management and control and making him principal and
employer. Yet the positions of the majority and minority views in the H4st case
would not seem to be so fundamentally divergent as is suggested by the instant
5. Hust v. Moore-McCormack, 323 U. S. 707, 738 (1946). The disenting opinion held
that a seaman may under the Jones Act sue only his employer. On the bases of a consideration of possession and control, the defendant was not deemed by the minority to be the
employer.
6. Caldarola v. Moore-IMcCormack Lines, 295 N. Y. 463, 63 N. E. (2d) 444 (1946).
7. Hust v. Moore-McCormack, 323 U. S. 707, 715, 719, 721 (1946). The court there
felt that were the plaintiff not successful in his action against the Moore-McCormack
Lines, seamen would lose the favored position they held under the ruling in Brady v.
Roosevelt S. S. Co., 317 U. S. 575 (1943), i.e., the right to sue the private operator (Ece
and
note 13 infra) and further, that any other decision would result in "uncertaintfi
complexities", resulting from the fact that, before the suit commenced, the seamen would
have to determine whether to sue the government or the private operator.
S. The War Shipping Clarification Act of March 24, 1943, 57 STLr. 45, 50 U. S. C. A.
§ 1291 (1944). The Supreme Court construed the Clarification Act as strengthening the
right seamen had under the ruling in the Brady case to sue the private operator. It would
appear rather that its purpose was to afford the government-employed seamen the Eame
benefits against the United States, enforceable under the Suits in Admiralty Act, 41 STAT.
525 (1920), 46 U. S. C. A. §§ 741-52 (1940), that he had when privately employed and
to confer these benefits regardless of the type of ship, provided it belonged to the War
Shipping Administration. See Sr--;. RP. No. 62, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943); H. R. REP.
No. 107, 7Sth Cong., 1st Sess. (1943), "This procedure [a modification of rights in that
they shall be enforced in accordance with the Suits in Admiralty Act] is appropriate In
view of the fact that the suits will be against the United States." See War Shipping Adm.
Contracts, 1944 Am. Mar. Cas. 594; Glover's Case, 1944 Am. Mar. Cas. 623.
9. 328 U. S. 707, 724, 725 (1946). "Here indeed is the respondent's fallacy, for it
assumes the case would be controlled by common law rules of private agency."
10. Caldarola v. Moore-McCormack,295 N. Y. 463, 63 N. E. (2d) 444 (1946).
i1. Hust v. MNfoore-McCormack, 328 U. S. 707, 734 (1946).
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opinion. In that'case the plaintiff was necessarily the employee and under the control
of either the defendant or the government. But despite numerous references to the
relation' of -the plaintiff to the government, at no time did the majority admit that
he was more than technically' 2 the employee of the United States for the purpose
of ultimate control in the performance of his work. Furthermore, the differences
pertinent to this point between the contract in the case of Brady v. Roosevelt S. S.
Co.' 3 and the present General Agency agr'eement' 4 -differences which the Court
of Appeals by inference apparently considers crucial to the question of control,15
-were deemed in the Hust case to be meticulous' 0 and to ". . . make it hardly
more than dubious
that respondent did not stand pro hac vice'as employer witl the
17
government".
It is, moreover, precisely the attitude of the majority in the Hust case toward
the Brady decision which makes difficult of acceptance the view that the court
contemplated a restriction of the principles of its opinion to causes of action brought
by seamen under the Jones Act. Tht case was expressly interpreted as recognizing generally a right of 'action in tort against the agent of a government-owned
vessel.' 8 And it was upon the authority of that case that the majority in the tlust
case seems largely to have rested its own decision. Yet the plaintiff in the Brady
case 'Wa gut a visitor on the ship, -not a seaman, and the action was not brought
under the Jones Act.
Perhaps the most significant clue to the view taken by the majority in the Hust
case of the scope of its opinion, however, is found in its own observation' 0 to the
effect that while the decision applies specifically only to Jones Act proceedings, it is
equally applicable to all maritime rights and remedies dependent upon existence of
an employer-employee relationship. And that such a broad interpretation is warranted finds further expression in the later case of Militano v. State Marite Cor12. Id. at 719, 723, 725, 731.
13. 317 U. S. 575 (1943). This case involved a suit under the Death on the High
Seas Act, 41 STAT. 537 (1920), 46 U. S. C. A. § 761 (1940). Plaintiff was administratrix
of a customs inspector fatally injured by a defective ladder while he was boarding a
;vessel.
14. In the Brady case the respondent was designated as managing agent for the
United States Maritime Commission ". .' . to manage, operate and conduct the business
of the Line . . . for and on behalf of the Owner and under its supervision and direction."
Respondent agreed to ". . . man, equip, victual, supply and operate the vessels, subject
to such restrictions and in such manner as -the Owner fmay prescribe . . ." and, "... subject to such regulation or methods of supervision and inspection as may be acquired or
prescribed . . ."' by the Commission, to ". . . exercise reasonable care and diligence to
maintain the vessels in a thordughly efficient state of repair . . ." See note 2 slpra for
details of thd General Agency Agreement in the Hust case.
15. Caldarola 'V. Moord-McCormack, 295 N. Y. 463, 68 N. E. (2d) 444 (1946). "We
agree *that'Brady v: Roosevelt S. S. Co. ". . . is not authority for plaintiff's position
here, since in the Brady "case the vessel was being operated under a different form of
agreemeit 'vith the United States, which agieement required the agent to man and
operate it."
16. Hust v. Moore-McCormack, 328 U. S. 707, 723, 724 (1946).
17. Id. at 723.
18. Id. at 717.
19. Hust v. Moore-McCormack, 328 U. S. 707, 719 (1946).
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poratioz20 wherein it was stated that, "If the agent remains the employer sufficiently
to be liable to members of the crew under the Jones Act, we think it cannot
escape the dutiesof an owner pro hac vice in other respects." 21

CONFLICT OF LAws-FULL FArrH AND CnEnr-PTBLIc PoLcY-Plaintiff, a resident of Michigan, brought an action there against an automobile owners New York
insurer which was authorized to do business in 'Michigan, for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident in Wisconsin. Under a statute of Wisconsin, where
the insurance policy was delivered, every policy was deemed to contain a clause
whereby an injured party could proceed directly against the insurer and disregard
the tort-feasor. But in Michigan, by statute, an injured person could proceed only
against the tort-feasor; the insurer could be neither a sole defendant nor a codefendant, nor could any mention be made during trial that the tort-feasor carried
insurance. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, claiming that no cause of

action existed against it in Michigan. The motion was granted. Upon appeal, keld,

two justices dissenting, judgment affirmed. Lieberthal v. Glcns Falls Indcmnty Co.,
-

Wisc. -,

24 N. W. (2d) 547 (1946).

Two separate opinions were written for the majority. A short one, concurred in
by two justices, simply held that the Michigan courts lacked jurisdiction of the suit.
The other, concurred in by three justices, assumed argucndo that the right granted
by the Wisconsin statute to proceed directly against the insurer in such a suit was

substantive, rather than procedural, in character. The general rule is that a foreign
statute applies if one of substance, but that the la, of the forum controls procedural
questions.' However, after assuming the question was one of substantive law, the
Wisconsin statute was refused recognition as contrary to the public policy of Michigan. This latter position was denied by the minority opinion, which asserted that
the provisions of the Wisconsin statute were binding2 upon the Michigan courts under
the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution.
Substantially the same facts as in the principal case were presented in three other
instances to state courts. None decided the problem on the basis of public policy.
.Mississippi applied a Louisiana statute similar to the Wisconsin one involved in the
principal case because it was held to grant a substantive right.a This holding was
20. 156 F. (2d) 599 (C. C. A. 2d, 1946). The plaintiff, a stevedore, sued the United
States and the general agent. The suit against the government was dismiss2d became
he had elected his remedy by recovering compensation under the Federal Employee's Compen-ation Act, 5 U. S. C. A. § 751, and for other reasons. As against the agent the court
remanded the cause for further proceedings for definite findings on the question of
negligence.
21. Id. at 602.
1. Northern Pacific R. R. v. Babcock, 154 U. S. 10, 197 (1894); Levy v. Steiger, 233
Mass. 600, 124 N. E. 477 (1919); Interstate Life and Accident Co. v. Pannell. 169 MUEs.
50, 152 So. 635 (1934); Fitzpatrick v. International Ry., 252 N. Y. 127, 169 N. E. 112
(1929); RSTX F_-ziT, Comrucr oF Lws (1934) § 585.
2. "Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and
judicial proceedings of every other state." U. S. Co."s?. Art. IV, § 1.
3. Burkett v. Globe Indemnity Co., 182 Miss. 423, 131 So. 316 (1938). In this ae the
plaintiff, a resident of Mississippi, was injured in Alabama as a result of negligence in
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overruled by a later decision 4 which followed the rulings of the Louisiana courts
that the statute involved was procedural in nature. Minnesota, holding that the
Wisconsin statute involved in this principal case created a substantive right, entertained a suit brought directly against the insurer by a person injured in an accident in Wisconsin. 5
Assuming the Wisconsin statute created a substantive right, could Michigan refuse
to give it effect as contrary to its own public policy? Under sound conflict of laws doctrine the courts of the forum will generally apply the foreign law applicable at the
situs of the tort or of the contract.( The obligation of one state to honor the statutes and judicial proceedings of another state is even greater 7 because of the full
faith and credit clause of the Constitution. 8 However, both under the conflict of
laws and full faith and credit requirements, public policy sets a limit beyond which
the courts of a state need not go in applying foreign law.9 Where the law of a
foreign country is involved, in the absence of treaty provisions to the contrary,
the states are final judges of Whether it violates their public policy.' 0 Where, however, the law of another state is involved, the United States Supreme Court is the
ultimate arbiter wherever there is a contention that the full faith and credit clause
of the Constitution was violated; 11 although the Supreme Court has recently indicated that it will follow the state court's definition of the public policy of the state. 12
What is, or is not, against the public policy of a state is not easily determined.
At the outset, a distinction should be made between the full faith and credit required
to be given on the one hand to the judgments, and on the other, to the statutes

Louisiaba. By Louisiana statute the insurer could be sued directly. Demurrer to complaint stating the Louisiana law was procedural in character and should not be applied
in Mississippi was overruled.
4. McArthur v. Maryland Casualty Co., 184 Miss. 663, 186 So. 305 (1939).
5. Kertson v. Johnson, 185 Minn. 591, 242 N. W. 329 (1932) (Accident in Wisconsin,
suit in Minnesota, nothing as to where policy of insurance was delivered; Wisconsin law
applied because tort occurred there).
6. "The law of the place of contracting determines the validity and effect of a promise. . ." RESTATEMENT, Co"rcT oF LAWS (1934) § 332. As for torts, the Restatement
states that "The law of the place of wrong determines whether a person has sustained a
legal injury." (§ 378). And "The place of wrong is in the state where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place." (§ 377). These principles
are not only supported by a "vested rights" theory of the conflict of laws, but also by
a "comity" view. See GooDRIcH, CoNFLcT oF LAWS (2d ed. 1938) §§ 5, 6, 89, 103.
7. Bond v. Hume, 243 U. S. 15, 22 (1917) ; Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U. S. 230 (1908).
8. Note 2 supra. Under earlier decisions of the Supreme Court, it seems that this
clause of the Constitution was held merely to prescribe a rule of evidence. AngeloAmerican Prov. Co. v. Davis Prov. Co., 191 U. S. 373, 374 (1903); Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U. S. 265, 291 (1888). However, later decisions clearly negatived such
a limited view. Kenney v. Supreme Lodge of the World, 252 U. S. 411 (1920); Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U. S. 230 (1908).
9. Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U. S. 498 (1941); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg.
Co., 313 U. S. 487 (1941); The Kensington, 183 U. S. 263, 269 (1901).
10. United States v. Pink, 315 U. S. 203, 216 (1942).
11. Pink v. A. A. A. Highway Express', Inc., 314 U. S. 201, 210 (1941).
12. Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U. S. 498, 507 (1941).
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of another state.la It is only the latter,14 not the former, 15 which are likely to
be disregarded in deference to the local policy of the forum. The standards by
which the local policy is tested vary. We are told that only in strong cases should
a court deny recognition of a foreign-acquired right; 16 that recognition should be
granted unless to do so ". . would violate some fundamental principle of justice,
some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal";'

7

that recognition should be granted "When . .. they are not contrary

to the known policy of the state, or injurious to its interests";18 that one state
"... may not. on grounds of policy, ignore a right which has lawfully vested elsewhere, if . . .the interest of the forum has but slight connection with the substance
13. It appears that judgments are entitled to a greater degree of full faith and credit.
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U. S. 430 (1943); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v.
Industrial Accident Comm., 306 U. S. 493 (1939); Alaska Packers v. Industrial Accident
Comm., 294 U. S. 532 (1935); Yarborough, 290 U. S. 202 (1933). See dicussion in
Williams v. N. C., 317 U. S. 2S7, 294, 295, 296 (1942).

14. Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U. S.493 (1941) (Suit brought in Texas on life insurance
policy delivered in New York. Policy was valid under the statutes of New York, but
invalid under Texas law which denied recovery to beneficiary without an insurable interest in the decedent. Held, that since the New York statute was opposed to the public
policy of Texas, the action would be dismissed.); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial
Comm., 305 U. S.493 (1939) (Employee of Massachusetts company working under employment contract made in that state was temporarily sent by his employer to California. While in California the employee was injured at his work. He brought suit under
California Workmen's Compensation Act, although in accordance with Massachusetts statute his employment contract provided that his sole remedy would be under the Massachusetts Corporation Act. Held, that California could ignore the Massachusetts statute
as contrary to its public policy); Alaska Packers Asso. v. Industrial Accident Comm.,
294 U. S.532 (1935); cf. Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S.145 (1932)
(Employment contract made in Vermont. The Vermont statute provided that its Workmen's Compensation Act was adopted as the exclusive remedy in ease of injury or death
in the course of employment. Administratrix of employee brought suit in New Hampshire
where employee had choice of suing under Compensation Act or on basis of common law
negligence. Defense that sole remedy was under Vermont act was upheld by the court in
dismissing the claim that this would be a contravention of the public policy of New
Hampshire.); Bond v. Hume, 243 U. S.15 (1917) (Contract validity made in New York
between citizen of Texas and citizen of New York for sale of cotton for future delivery.
Making of such contract in Texas was a criminal act. Suit on the contract in Texas was
held not to be contrary to the public policy of that state.)
15. Kenney v. Supreme Lodge of the World, 252 U. S.411 (1920). The Illinois statute
providing that no action shall be brought in that state for wrongful death occurring in
another state was held to violate the full faith and credit clause, when construed to
prevent suit on an Alabama judgment for wrongful death; Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U. S.
230 (1908) (Two citizens of Mississippi made a contract for dealing in cotton futures
in violation of state law. One recovered a judgment, based on the contract, against the
other in Missouri. Mississippi was required to give full faith and credit to such judgment.)
16. GooDnRc1, Co-rcrs or- LAW (2d ed. 1933) §§ 8, 94, 103.
17. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N. Y. 99, 111, 120 N. E. 193, 202 (1918).
18. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Peters 519, 5S9 (U. S.1339).
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of the . . obligations"'1 involved; that the interests of the two states in the matter
involved must be weighed and the law of the one with the superior interest must
prevail and that where there is such a conflict the party seeking to contravene the
local policy 20of the forum has the burden of proving that the local law should be
disregarded.
These are but illusive sign-posts. From the mass of decisions, however, we can
extract some fairly definite principles. A mere difference in the provisions of the
statutes of two states does not by itself indicate that their respective public policies are in conflict. 2 1 A court of one state need not enforce a right vested in another

where to do so will require the performance of an illegal act within the jurisdiction. 22
Finally, the public policy of a state will probably give way where to enforce it
would be a denial of due process to a litigant.m Beyond these principles there seem
to be only irreconcilables. Concepts of public policy shift not only from state
to state0 24 and within the same state,2s but also in the opinions of the Supreme
2

Court.

Despite the many seemingly conflicting decisions, it appears that generally the
courts of one state will apply the law of another state differing from its own. An
19. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Delta and Pine Land Co., 292 U. S. 143,
150 (1934).
20. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Duel, 324 U. S. 154 (1945); Alaska
Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm., 294 U. S. 532 (1935).
21. Stewart v. B. & 0. R. R., 168 U. S. 445 (1897); Northern Pacific R. R. v. Babcock, 154 U. S. 190 (1894); Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N. Y. 99, 120 N. E. 198
(1918); GOODRICH, Co mlI.cT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1938).
22. Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U. S. 216 (1933); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U. S.

397 (1929) ; Bothwell v. Buckbee, Mears Co., 275 U. S. 274 (1927).
23. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Delta and Pine Land Co., 292 U. S.
143 (1943) (Action in Mississippi on insurance policy issued in Tennessee, policy provided for short statute of limitations. Such provision was void in Mississippi, but It was
allowed as a valid defense because, since the insurer was no longer liable on the policy
under the contract as made in Tennessee, it would be a taking of property without due
process of law if it were held liable in Mississippi.); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U. S.
397 (1929).
24. The foreign rule was held not to govern in the following cases: Falls v. U. S.
Savings Loan and Bldg. Co., 97 Ala. 417, 13 So. 25 (1892) (usury law differing from that
of the forum); Personal Finance Co. v. Gilinsky Fruit Co., 127 Neb. 450, 255 N. W. 558
(1934), cert. denied, 293 U. S. 627 (1934) (usury law); Flagg v. Baldwin, 38 N. 3. Eq.
219 (1884) (gambling contract); Herzog v. Stem, 264 N. Y. 379, 191 N. E. 23 (1934),
cert. denied, 293 U. S. 597 (1934) (survival statute); First Nat. Bank v. Shaw, 109 Tenn.
237, 70 S. W. 807 (1902) (married woman's contract); Fox v. Postal Tel. Co., 138 Wis.
648, 120 N. W. 399 (1909) (liability exemption clause). But the following cAses in similar situations held the foreign law would apply: Cleveland C. C. and St. L. Ry. v. Drulen,
118 Ky. 237, 80 S. W. 778 (1904) (liability exemption clause); Chubbuck v. Holloway,
182 Minn. 225, 234 N. W. 314 (1931) (survival statute); Thompson v. Taylor, 66 N. J.
L. 253, 49 AtI. 544 (1901) (married woman's contract); Loucks v. Standard Oil Co.,
224 N. Y. 99, 120 N. E. 198 (1918) (wrongful death act).
25. Compare Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N. Y. 99, 120 N. E. 198 (1918) with
Straus and Co. v. Canadian Prac. Ry., 254 N. Y. 407, 173 N. E. 564 (1930).
26. Compare Bond v. Hume, 243 U. S. 15 (1916) with Griffin v. McCoacb, 313 U. S.
498 (1941).
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examination of the many cases brought in the courts of one state but involving
automobile accidents in another state will bear this out. Thus, in numerous instances the courts apply principles of tort law which would not be followed had the
accident occurred in the forum; for example, that a driver is liable to his guests
for gross negligence only,27 that a driver is liable to his guests for merely ordinary
negligence, 2S that contributory negligence is a defense,2 that the theory of comparative negligence applies,30 that the negligence of the driver is imputed to a passenger in the automobile,31 and that the owner of a car is not liable for the negligence of a person to whom he lends it32 Concerning the right of one spouse to
sue the other for negligence there is, however, a conflict as to whether the law of
the domicile 33 or the law of the place of accident governs.3 4 There is also a conflict
as to whether the law of the place of the tort or the law of the forum determines
the survival of a right of action where a party is killed in an accidentP5
It is submitted that in the principal case the court was not justified in dismissing
the suit based on the Wisconsin statute as contrary to the public policy of Michigan. The accident occurred in Wisconsin and the insurance contract was delivered
there. There was nothing to be done in Michigan which was illegal there. The right
of plaintiff had vested in Wisconsin. 36 He was merely seeing to enforce it in
27. Mackey v. Robertson, 32S Pa. 504, 195 AUt. 370 (1933); Brumsey v. MathLis,
216 N. C. 743, 6 S. E. (2d) 495 (1940).
23. Loranger v. Nadeau, 215 Cal. 362, 10 Pac. (2d) 63 (1932); Murphy v. Smith,
307 Mass. 64, 29 N. E. (2d) 726 (1940); Collins v. McClure, 143 Ohio St. 569, 56 N. E.
(2d) 171 (1944); Sutton v. Bland, 156 Va. 132, 134 S. E. 231 (1936).

29. Myrick v. Griffin, 146 Fla. 143, 200 So. 333 (1941); Peck's Admin. v. Bell Line,
284 Ky. 2S3, 144 S. W. (2d) 433 (1940) ; Stiles v. Wright, 303 Mass. 326, 32 N. E. (2d)
220 (1941); Cox v. Terminal Ass'n., 331 Mo. 910, 55 S. W. (2d) 635 (1932); Singer v.
Messina, 312 Pa. 129, 167 AUt. 583 (1933).
30. Ramey v. Missouri Pacific R. R., 323 Mo. 662, 21 S.W. (2d) 873 (1929), cert.
denied, 280 U. S. 614 (1930); Rice-Stix Dry Goods Co. v. Self, 20 Tenn. App. 493, 101
S.W. (2d) 132 (1936).
31. Smith v. Brown, 302 Mass. 432, 19 N. E. (2d) 732 (1929); Laughlin v. Michigan
Motor Freight Lines, 276 Mich. 545, 26S N. W. 867 (1936); Shaffer v. N. Y. Central
Ry., 66 Ohio App. 417, 34 N. E. (2d) 792 (1940).

32. Cherwein v. Geiter, 272 N. Y. 165, 5 N. E. (2d) 135 (1936); Darian v. McGrath,
215 Minn. 339, 10 N. W. (2d) 403 (1943); Zowin v. Peoples Brewing Co., 225 Wis. 120,
273 N. W. 466 (1937).
33. In the following decisions the law of the domicile was held to govern because
it is against public policy for one spouse to sue the other: Kircher v. Kircher, 233 Mich.
669, 286 N. W. 120 (1939); Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N. Y. 466, 3 N. E. (2d) 597 (1936);
Poling v. Poling, 116 W. Va. 137, 179 S.E. 604 (1935).
34. The law of the place of accident was held to govern in Alberts v. Alberts, 217
N. C. 443, S S. E. (2d) 523 (1940) (accident in North Carolina, domicile in Maszachusetts); Bourestom v. Bourestom, 231 Wis. 666, 285 N. W. 426 (1934) (accident in O.2ahoma where spouse could sue; domicile in Minnesota where spouse could not sue; suit
in Wisconsin).
35. The law of state of accident was held to apply, In re Estate of Daniels, 203 Minn.
420, 294 N. W. 465 (1940); Friedman v. Greenberg, 110 N. J. L. 462, 166 Ad. 119
(1933). Contra: Herzog v. Stern, 264 N. Y. 379, 191 N. E. 23 (1934), cert. drded, 293
U. S. 597 (1934).
36. Some writers naintain- that once a right has vested in one of the United States,
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Michigan. Both the full faith and credit doctrine and responsible conflict of
laws theory would indicate that it was imperative for Michigan to entertain the
suit.3 7 If courts are free to disregard'the requirements of full faith and credit upon
the slightest pretext of public policy, this provision of the Constitution will become
greatly weakened.

CRIMINAL LAw-FINGERPRINTS AND

PHOTOGRAPHs-RIGHT OF POLICE TO TAKE,

DISSEMINATE AND RETA N.-The Complainant brought an action to compel the Indianapolis Police Department to return or destroy fingerprint records and photographs
taken at the time of his arrest for a misdemeanor. He alleged that although he had
been acquitted of the charge and had not previously been arrested, his photograph
was retained and exhibited in a rogues' gallery with those of hardened criminals.
He also requested the return of copies of his prints and photographs which had been
transmitted to the Indiana State Police and to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. A demurrer was sustained. Upon appeal, held, the complainant is entitled to an
injunction against the display of his photograph in a rogues' gallery but to no other
relief. State ex rel. Mavity v. Tyndall et al., - Ind. -, 66 N. E. (2d) 755 (1946).
The problem of police -identification procedures involves three principal issues:
the right of the police to subject an arrested suspect to fingerprinting and photography prior to conviction; the right to disseminate these to other agencies and to display the photographs in a rogues' gallery prior to conviction and in the absence of
an escape; the right to retain such records subsequent to an acquittal or dismissal
of the charges. That the police may take fingerprints and photographs of the accused
its enforcement can never be against the public policy of a sister state. They argue that
all the states are subject to the Constitution and subscribe to the same basic theories of
morals and law and that any differences relate only to the minor morals of expediency and
to debatable questions of internal policy. See Beach, Uniform Interstate Enforcement Of
Vested Rights, 27 YALE L. J. 656 (1918).
37. Boseman v. Conn. General Life Ins. Co., 301 U. S. 196 (1937) (Group insurance
policy issued in Pennsylvania. Suit brought under it by Texas citizen in Texas, Provision
in policy required that notice of claim be given within sixty days after it arose. By Texas
law any such provision requiring less than ninety days' notice was void. The Pennsylvania law was held to govern.); John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U. S.
178 (1936)) (Policy of insurance delivered in New York. Insured died. Widow moved to
Georgia and brought suit there. Under New York statutes the insurer had a good defense because of certain misstatements in the application for the insurance pojicy. This
was not true under Georgia law, but the Supreme Court held that Georgia must give
full faith and credit to the New York statute.); Modern Woodmen of America v. Mixer,
267 U. S. 544 (1924) (Laws of domicile of fraternal order controlled and not laws of
state where member resided and brought action to determine validity of asgessments);
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U. S. 389 (1924) (Insurance contract issued in Tennessee. Suit in Texas under whose law insurance company had to pay penalty for delay
in paying legitimate claim. Full faith and credit was given to contrary Tennessee statute.) ;
in Dennick v. Central R. R., 103 U. S. 11 (1881) the court said, "Wherever, by either the
common law or the statute law of a State, a right has become fixed and a legal liability
incurred, that liability may be enforced and the right of action pursued in any court
which has jurisdiction of such matters and can obtain jurisdiction of the parties."
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at the time of his arrest for a crime is sustained by the weight of authority.1 The
reasons for the rule are well stated in what New Jersey courts refer to as the first
Bartletta case.2 Such practice is justified on three grounds: (1) that fingerprints
are often required to identify the accused either as the guilty party or as a second
offender; 3 (2) the photograph would be a distinct aid in the event of a subsequent
escape; (3) these records may well establish the innocence of the defendant. 4 Contrary to the general practice of allowing the police to make such records, the New
York courts adopted a different view of this fundamental problem, holding that
the police had no right to subject the accused to these processes prior to conviction.3 Recognizing the need for these records, in 1928 the New York legislature authorized
the taking of both fingerprints and photographs of criminal suspects upon
6
arrest.
Most courts as a common law proposition seem to be agreed that, in the absence
of an 'escape, the records made upon arrest should not be disseminated or published
prior to a conviction. 7 This would also appear to be the rule of the federal courts,
1. Shaffer v. United States, 24 App. D. C. 417 (1904), cert. denied, 196 U. S. 639 (190S) ;
Shannon v. State, 207 Ark. 658, 182 S. W. (2d) 384 (1944), where it was held that even
though a person has been released upon bail he could still be forced to submit to fingerprinting and photography before trial. Downs v. Swann, 111 Md. 53, 73 Adt. 653 (1909) ;
see Bruns v. Clausmeier, 154 Ind. 599, 57 N. E. 541, 542 (1900). But see Wright & Taylor
v. Leigh, 229 Ky. 32, 16 S. W. (2d) 493, 495 (1929); Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 117 La.
70S, 42 So. 228, 229 (1906) ; Schulman v. Whitaker, 117 La. 704, 42 So. 227, 228 (lS05);
Bartletta v. McFeeley, 107 N. J. Eq. 141, 152 All. 17 (ch. 1930).
2. Bartletta v. McFeeley, 107 N. J. Eq. 141, 152 At!. 17 (ch. 1930).
3. Few courts have held that compulsory fingerprinting is contrary to one's constitutional right against self-incrimination. People v. Heverin, 127 Misc. 141, 215 N. Y. Supp.
412 (Mag. Ct. 1926). But the weight of authority is contra: People v. Sallow, 1C0 Mi-c.
447, 165 N. Y. Supp. 915 (Gen. Sess. 1917). Shaffer v. United States, 24 App. D. C. 417
(1904).
4. Thps if fingerprints were found at the scene of the crime and the accused's fingerprints did not correspond, it would help in securing his release.
S. Owen v. Partridge, 40 Misc. 415, 420, S2 N. Y. Supp. 243, 252 (Sup. Ct. 1903). Where
the court by way of dicta states: "In the view I take of this application, however, I do
not deem it necessary to examine further the by no means clear question of the right to
take for police purposes the photograph of a person merely suspected of crime." People v.
Hevern, 127 Misc. 141. 215 N. Y. Supp. 412 (Mag. Ct. 1942); Hawkins v. Kuhne, 153
App. Div. 216, 137 N. Y. Supp. 1090 (1912), wherein the court agreed with the defendant's lawyer who conceded that photographing the plaintiff before conviction was an
illegal act. People ex rel Gow v. Bingham, 57 Misc. 66, 107 N. Y. Supp. 1011 (Sup. Ct.
1907).
6. N. Y. CODE CR. PRoC. § 940. Similar provisions are found in the statutes of other

states, for example, Pa. Acts of 1937, No. 454, § 3. Under § 5, however, the police
are not authorized to take the fingerprints of a person convicted for a misdemeanor.
7. Very similar to this problem is the question whether or not a person's photograph
may be exhibited in a rogues' gallery between the time of arrest and the time of trial.
The decided cases are few, but the better rule and the majority view is that such a display is actionable and dissemination can be enjoined. Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 117 La. 703,
42 So. 228 (1906), affirming 115 La. 479, 39 So. 499 (1905); Schulman v. Whitaker, 117
La. 704, 42 So. 227 (1906), affirming 115 La. 628, 39 So. 737 (1905); Downs v. Swann,
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at least by way of dicta, for in State v. Kely8 the court quotes with approval the instruction to United States marshals given by the Attorney-General that all such records
should not be made public prior to conviction.0 In a recent case 10 upon the subject
the New Jersey Court expressed the opinion that unless an accused becomes a fugitive from justice, no right exists to publish or disseminate his records in advance
of conviction11 and that so to do ". . . constitutes an unnecessary and unwarranted
his natural right of privacy, since it
attack upon his character and reputation, and
12
serves no useful or necessary public need."'
The right of an acquitted defendant to the return of his records has been considered by both courts' 8 and legislatures. 14 In State v. Kelly'8 the federal 'court
indicated that United States attorneys and marshals are required to destroy or surrender all identification records after an acquittal or discharge. In Fernlicola v.
Keenan,16 however, the New Jersey court held that, apart from statute, the destruction or return of such identification records may not be compelled and, although
of the opinion that the police should destroy the photographs ". . . when a man of
good repute has a false charge made against him.", 17 left the matter completely to
111 Md. 53, 73 At]. 653 (1909); State ex rel Reed v. Harris, 348 Mo. 426, 153 S. W. (2d)
834 (1941).
8. 55 F. (2d) 67 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932), reversing 51 F. (2d) 263 (E. D. N. Y. 1931).
The Kelly case really only decided that it is lawful for officers to take photographs and
fingerprints when an arrest is made.
9. Id. at 70.
10. McGovern v. Van Riper, 137 N. J.Eq. 24, 43 A. (2d) 514, 525 (ch. 1945).
11. Compare the New York Statute which provides for the dissemination of this material prior to conviction. N. Y. CODE CR. PROC. § 941; cf. § 2062 of the CALTFoRNrA PENAL

(1941) which provides for the dissemination of such records only after conviction.
12. McGovern v. Van Riper, 137 N. J.Eq. 24, 43 A. (2d) 514, 525 (Ch. 1945).
13. People ex rel Joyce v. York, 27 Misc. 658, 59 N. Y. Supp. 418 (Sup. Ct. 1899),
where a convicted defendant sought to have his fingerprints returned. Owen v,Patrldge,
40 Misc. 415, 82 N. Y. Supp. 248 (Sup. Ct. 1903), where the court not only refused to
return the identification records of an unconvicted defendant but refused to compel the
police to take them out of a rogues' gallery; Matter of Molineux v. Collins, 177 N. Y. 395,
69 N. E. 727 (1904). In the last cited case the petitioner's picture was taken while he
was awaiting execution. He was subsequently given a new trial and was acquitted. The
courts held that independent of statute he had no right to the return of the photograph.
See Hodgeman v. Oisen, 86 Wash. 615, 150 Pac. 1122 (1915), where it was held that
a paroled party could -not compel the superintendent of the institution of which he had
been an inmate to return the records made.
14. N. Y. PENAL LAw § 516. grants to an unconvicted defendant the right to re-possess the identification records made at the time of his arrest. The refusal of an officer
to surrender said records is made a misdemeanor. It is evident that this section (N. Y.
LAws (1907), c. 626,_§ 1) was passed to correct the rule of law established In Matter
,of Molineuxc v. Collins, 177 N. Y. 395, 69 N. E. 727 (1904), see note 13 supra. Similar
statutes have been passed by other states, for'example Pa. Acts 1937, No. 454, § 5(c)
Ill.
Laws 1931, c. '38, § '780.
15. 55 F. (2d)'67 (C: C. A. 2d, 1932); reversing 51 F. (2d) 263 (E.D. N. Y. 1931).
16. 136 N. J. Eq. 9, 39 A. (2d)' 851 (ch. 1944).
171 Ibid.
CODZ

1947]

RECENT DECISIONS

the discretion of the police.' 8 The New York courts have likewise consistently re-

fused relief in similar cases. 10
The foregoing problems involve essentially the balancing of public against private interests. That law enforcing agencies should have the right upon arrest of a
suspect to subject him to identification procedures would seem today to be beyond
dispute. The situation in regard to dissemination and detention is, however, less
clear. Dissemination, in the absence of a conviction, and the publication of the
and constitute
photographs of the acquitted in rogues' gallery approximate libel29
a potential source of embarrassment and vexation. On the other hand the value of
such records to those engaged in the prevention and detection of crime is obvious.
Nor is it sufficient to say that the purposes of the latter group wil be served if
such rights are restricted to the case of those convicted of crimes.21 It is equally

important that such agencies have available all possible identification records of
".. . men who have never been convicted of an indictable offense, but whose
association and manner of life are such that the police feel reasonably assured
unless he turn over a new leaf, will eventually be guilty of a
that such a one,
22
serious crime."

As noted above, the court in Fenicola v. Keettw

relegated the matter to the

18. Cf. the language in Bingham v. Gow, 57 Aisc. 66, 75, 107 N. Y. Supp. 1011, 1017
(1907), on the matter of leaving unlimited discretion with the police on the related quetion of taking fingerprints. "To sustain a mere rule of the police department under such
circumstances would be to confer upon the officials of that department, not only executive, but legislative and judicial powers. The founders of our government were exceedingly careful to distribute the sovereign power of the state among the executive, legilative and judicial branches thereof, and to provide that neither should trezpass upon the
domain of the other. The time has not yet come when the entire sovereign power of the
people of the state, executive, legislative and judicial, is united in a member of the police
force."
19. See note 13 supra. It is clear that today both New York and New Jersey are in
an anomalous position. New York, by statute, permits the return of these records after
an acquittal yet it provides for the dissemination of fingerprints without the state prior
to conviction. N. Y. CODE CR. PROC. § 941. New Jersey, on the other hand, refuzs to
return photographs and prints as a matter of right after an acquittal, yet it held a law
providing for dissemination before conviction unconstitutional. Fernicola v. Keenan, 136
N. J. Eq. 9, 39 A. (2d) 351 (ch. 1944); McGovern v. Van Riper, 137 N. J. Eq. 24, 43 A.
(2d) 514 (ch. 1945).
20. Owen v. Patridge, 40 Misc. 415, 82 N. Y. Supp. 24S (Sup. CL 1 03); People
ex rel Joyce v. York, 27 Misc. 65S, 509 N. Y. Supp. 413 (Sup. CL 1399).
21. "Criminal identification by means of fingerprints is one of the most potent factors in obtaining the apprehension of fugitives who might otherwise escape arrest and continue their criminal activities indefinitely. This type of identification also results in the
imposition of more equitable sentences by the judiciary, as it makes possieble an accurate
determination of the number of previous arrests and convictions, justifying more szvere
punishment of the individual who violates the law repeatedly. It enables the prozczutor
to present his case in the light of the previous record of the offender and provides the
probation officers, parole board and the Governor with definite information upon which
Bunntr or Isr TocA72.OrN,
to base dealings with criminals in their jurisdiction." FrmLr.
U. S. DEPArTr_,T or JusrcE, Cx.ss"cxATo.N oF FI;G~MPnnM, p. 1.
22. Fernicola v. Keenan, 136 N. J. Eq. 9, 39 A. (2d) 851 (ch. 1944).
23. 136 N. J. Eq. 9, 39 A. (2d) 851 (ch. 1944).
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discretion of the police. In the instant case such a solution was avoided and in its
place was set up the requirement that each case should be determined ". . . by
balancing the complainant's right of privacy against the public interest. ' 21 In order
to prevail, the petitioner must show some actual or threatened harm to himself
before the police would be required to destroy the records.2 r
Neither solution would seem to hold promise of justice. Granting such plenary
powers to an agency, the interest of which may be adverse to that of the individual
concerned, would often place the latter in a disadvantageous position. Nor is the
proposal by the court in the principal case adequate since in most instances the
danger is prospective rather than actual. A more just and workable rule would seem
to be one wherein the petitioner would be held to have made out a prima facie case
by showing his acquittal and the fact that he has no prior criminal record, with
the burden then shifting to the law enforcement agency to show additional circumstances warranting the retention of such records.

DOMESTIC RELATIONS-FoREIGN DIVORCE-COLLATERAL ATTACK BY THIRD PARTY.

-The plaintiff applied for a decree annuling his marriage to the defendant upon
the ground that at the time the defendant married him she had a husband still living. The defendant married her first husband in New York City in 1940. In 1944,
a Nevada court awarded her a decree of divorce, her husband appearing in the action
by attorney. Four days after obtaining that decree, and while her first husband was
still living, she and the present plaintiff were married in New York City. One child
was born of the marriage. Held, application denied on the ground that the appearance in the foreign jurisdiction rendered the divorce decree immune from collateral
attack by plaintiff, a third party. Holloway v. Holloway, 187 Misc. 388, 63 N. Y. S.
(2d) 915 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
Since the particular problem involved in the principal case is inextricably interwoven with the public policy of each individual state, our analysis of the question will be limited to what appears to be the present state of the law in New
York. It is well settled that the divorce decree rendered by the court of a sister
state in which both parties to the action were domiciled is protected by the full
faith and credit clause of the Constitution and must be given effect in New York.2
Divorce actions which have most often led to subsequent litigation have been those
brought in foreign jurisdictions by parties not domiciled therein. Two problems
almost invariably present themselves for resolution. First, whether the decree
has been procured under such circumstances as to render it subject to collateral attack
in this state. Second, if it is so subject, whether the party seeking collaterally to attack the decree is one who may properly do so. 3 Solutions to these problems have
entailed varying degrees of difficulty.
24. State ex rel Mavity v. Tyndall, 25. Id. at 762.

Ind. -, 66 N. E. (2d) 755, 763 (1946).

1. U. S. CONST. Art. IV, § 1.
2. Rupp. v. Rupp., 156 App. Div. 389, 141 N. Y. Supp. 484 (2d Dep't 1913); Hunt v.
Hunt, 72 N. Y. 217 (1878).
3. The effect on those problems of Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226 (1945),
has been appropriately described as follows: "Indeed, instead of narrowing and standardizing the law determinative of the extra-territorial validity of divorce decrees, the
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119

The least troublesome group of cases have been those wherein neither party appeared in the foreign jurisdiction, i.e., mail order divorces. It is safe to say that

a decree so procured is absolutely without effect in this jurisdiction 4 and that even
the non-appearing plaintiff may collaterally attack it in a subsequent action for
divorce in this state.5
There is also little doubt, if any, as to the law applicable to cases where plaintiff
appeared in the foreign jurisdiction but the defendant was served constructively and
did not appear, either in person or by attorney. That such decrees are subject to
collateral attack has long been well established.0 The plaintiff in the original action,
however, may not in such a case collaterally attack the foreign decree in a subsequent action here.7 The theory upon which his disability is predicated partakes of
the nature of estoppel.8 But the non-appearing defendant 9 and third parties l o suffer
from no such infirmity. Even where the third party has married one of the parties
to the original action, not only with knowledge of the foreign decree, but after actually paying the expenses and costs of the proceeding out of his own funds, it has
been held that he will, nonetheless, have the right collaterally to attack the decree. 11
reasoning and some of the language in Williams v. State of North Carolina, supra, second
appeal ...are likely to open questions, theretofore deemed closed, as to the conclusive-

ness of consensual decrees entered on arranged notices of appearance but based on domidie not really litigated and in actual fact pretended and sham." Kurski v. Kurshki, 185
Misc. 97, 101, 55 N. Y. S. (2d) 743, 752 (Dom. Rel. 1945). For an extenscive discusaon
of the implications of the Supreme Court in the two Williams cases, see Powell, And
Repent at Leisure (1945) 53 Hsnv. L. Rxv. 930, 975, 991, 1C05, 1006, 1C07, 1017.
4. Sandberg v. Sandberg, - Misc. -, 54 N. Y. S. (2d) 830 (Sup. Ct. 1945), af'd merm,
269 App. Div. 821, 56 N. Y. S. (2d) 204 (1st Dep't 1945); Querze v. Querze, 250 N. Y.
13, 47 N. E. (2d) 423 (1943); Vose v. Vose, 2S0 N. Y. 779, 21 N. E. (2d) 616 (1939).
5. Querze v. Querze, 290 N. Y. 13, 47 N. E. (2d) 423 (1943). The sole exception to
the rule as set forth involves an attempt by the plaintiff in the foreign jurisdiction to sue
in this jurisdiction on a private claim or demand arising out of the marriage. Id. at 17,
47 N. E. (2d) at 424.
6. See notes 9 and 10 infra.
7. Krause v. Krause, 232 N. Y. 355, 26 N. E. (2d) 290 (1940); Starbuck v. Starbuck,
173 N. Y. 503, 66 N. E. 193 (1903); Matter of Morrison, 52 Hun. 102 (N.Y. 13S9)
(claimants under plaintiff in the foreign jurisdiction held to occupy the same position he
would have occupied had he been living); cf. Stevens v. Stevens, 273 N. Y. 157, 7 N. E.
(2d) 26 (1937). But see Holmes v. Holmes, 4 Lans. 383, 392 (N. Y. 1871).
S. "It is conceded that the estoppel which is involved '... is not a true estoppel as
that term is ordinarily understood, although the effect is the same.. !"' Krause v. Krause,
282 N. Y. 355, 360, 26 N. E. (2d) 290, 292 (1940), 9 FonRam L. R v. 242.
9. Howard v. Howard, 187 Misc. 16, 63 N. Y. S. (2d) S57 (Sup. CL 1946); Krause
v. Krause, 2S2 NL.Y. 355, 26 N. E. (2d) 290 (1940); Cross v. Cross, 103 N. Y. 623,
15 N. E. 333 (1SSS).
10. Davis v. Davis, 279 N. Y. 657, 13 N. E. (2d) 301 (1933) (second husband granted
annulment); Lefferts v. Lefferts, 263 N. Y. 131, 133 N. E. 279 (1933) (second husband
husband
permitted to set up as a defense invalidity of plaintiff's divorce from her firsct
notwithstanding his advice to her to procure the foreign decree).
11. Heusner v. Heusner, 181 Misc. 1015, 42 N. Y. S. (2d) 350 (Sup. CL 1943). Bill cf.
Kaufman v. Kaufman, 177 App. Div. 162, 163 N. Y. Supp. 566 (Ist Dep't 1917), in which
the second husband persuaded and induced defendant to obtain the Nevada decree. Al-
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The principal problem to be considered arises out of that line of decisions which
deal with divorce actions in which both parties appeared in the foreign jurisdiction.
Prior to the second Williams12 case it could be stated with some degree of assur1
jurisdicance that divorce decrees granted by foreign courts having in personant'
tion over both parties were valid in New York and, under most circumstances, 14
immune from collateral attack by plaintiff, defendant, or third party. Even today,
it appears that a collateral attack on the foreign decree by those who actually participated in the foreign action 'is still precluded. 15 The plaintiff is certainly in no
better position than he is when there has been constructive service upon the defendant.' 0 The defendant has not lost the right of collateral attack if he can show
that his appearance in the foreign state was procured through fraud 17 or that the
attorney appearing for him therein did so without authority.18 As a general rule,
however, he, too, is unable to attack the decree collaterally; and this is true apparently, whether or not the pivotal question of plaintiff's bona fide residence was actually litigated in the foreign jurisdiction. 19 . As has been indicated,20 the basis for
though no decision of the Court of Appeals has gone as far as the Heusner case, It seems
to be within the spirit of Davis v. Davis, 279 N. Y. 657, 18 N. E. (2d) 301 (1938).
12.

325 U. S. 226 (1945).

13. A provocative discussion of the evolution of New York's emphasis on the necessity
of pbrsonal jurisdiction is contained in Greene, The Enforcement of a Foreign Divorce Decree in New York (1926) 11 CoRN. L. Q. 141, 159.
14. See notes 18 and 19 infra, and accompanying text.
15. The statement by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Williams v. North Carolina, 325
U. S. 226, 230 (1945), although dicta, is indicative of a possible future ruling. ". . .those
not parties to a litigation ought not to be foreclosed by the interested actions of others;
especially not a State which is concerned with the vindication of its own social policy and
has no means, certainly no effective means, to protect that interest against the selfish action of those outside its borders. . . . As to the truth or existence of a fact, like that of
domicil, upon which depends the power to exert judicial authority, a State not a party to
the exertion of such judicial authority in another State but seriously affected by it has a
right, when asserting its own unquestioned authority, to ascertain the truth or existence
of that crucial fact." By way of forewarning, it seems, the Court appended a note to
the foregoing quote which reads a follows: "We have not here a situation where a State
disregards the adjudication of another State on the issue of domicil squarely litigated In a
truly adversary proceeding." (Italics supplied).
16. See note 7 supra.
17. Gagliano v. Gagliano, - Misc. -, 56 N. Y. S. (2d) 619 (Sup. Ct. 1945), afl'd,
269 App. Div. 1025, 59 N. Y. S. (2d) 377 (1st Dep't 1945); Prime v. Hinton, 244 App.
Div. 181, 279 N. Y. Supp. 37 (1st Dep't 1935).
18. Kerr v. Kerr, 41 N. Y. 272 (1869).
19. Actual litigation of question of residence: Verbeck v. Verbeck, 187 Misc. 750, 63 N.
Y. S. (2d) 419 (Sup. Ct. 1946). The law in New York is in accord with the rule as set forth
in RESTATnMNT, JUDOMENTS (1942) § 10, comment a. No actual litigation: Glaser v.
Glaser, 276 N. Y. 296, 299, 12 N. E. 305, 307 (1938), 7 FoRnHxz

L. Rav. 258 (Andrews

v. Andrews, 188 U. S. 14 (1903), distinguished on the ground that this State has no
statute expressing a public policy similar to that expressed by the Massachusetts statute
involved in that decision); Ansorge v. Armour, 267 N. Y. 492, 196 N. E. 546 (1935);
Tiedemann v. Tiedemann, 172 App. Div. 819, 158 N. Y. Supp. 851 (1st Dep't 1916), aff'd,
225 N. Y. 709, 122 N. B. 892 (1919), writ dismissed, 251 U. S.536 (1919); Schneider v.
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denying the right of collateral attack partakes of the nature of an estoppel although
it has been pointed out that no element of a true estoppel is present. - It is difficult to see how that doctrine, whatever its nomenclature, can be made to apply
to parties who were strangers to and not in privity with either of the spouses involved in the original action. Consistent with that difficulty is the confusion manifested by the courts as to the rights of such third parties to attack the foreign decree
22
collaterally.
Cases in this jurisdiction squarely deciding the point are surprisingly few.p Tke
court in the principal case based its decision directly upon the recent decision in
Shea V. Shea,24 wherein defendants, the executors of the will of plaintiff's second
husband,2 were denied the right collaterally to attack the foreign divorce decree
obtained by plaintiff from her first husband, who had appeared personally in the
foreign jurisdiction. The majority took the position that such decrees concern only
the parties and the state and that the public policy of this state was not offended
".. . when citizens, originally domiciled here, go to another jurisdiction to obtain
a divorce founded on personal service and personal appearance and based on grounds
Schneider, 232 App. Div. 71, 249 N. Y. Supp. 131 (2d Dep't 1931), afg'd, 263 N. Y. 641,
1S9 N. E. 736 (1934).
20. See note 3 supra.
21. (1913) 13 COL. L. REv. 241, 242; see note S supra.
22. ". . . confusion is most evident in cases where relief is sought by the second husband." Rosenberg v. Perles, 132 Misc. 727, 731, 50 N. Y. S. (2d) 24, 27 (Sup. CL 1944)
(second husband granted annulment on counterclaim in action for similar relief by wife
who had been plaintiff in the Nevada action). ". . . there is apparently some difference of
opinion as to whether or not such third person is bound by the judgment. . ." Verbcck
v. Verbeck, 137 Misc. 750, 756, 63 N. Y. S. (2d) 419, 420 (Sup. Ct. 1946) (relief denied
to defendant who had appeared in the foreign jurisdiction and actually litigated question
of plaintiff's bona fide domicile).
23. Shea v. Shea, 270 App. Div. 527, 60 N. Y. S. (2d) 323 (2d Dep't 1946); Rozenberg v. Perles, 182 Misc. 727, 50 N. Y. S. (2d) 24 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (second husband granted annulment on counterclaim); cf. Matter of Lindgren, 293 N. Y. 18, 55 N. E. (2d) 349
(1944) (child of plaintiff in the foreign action allowed to impeach validity of foreign
decree--child's mother did not appear in the original action but two years later she obtained a nunc pro tunc order to amend the divorce decree to include a recital of her
appearance); Sorenson v. Sorenson, 219 App. Div. 344M,
220 N. Y. Supp. 242 (2d Dep't
1927) (defendant's first husband had divorced her in Denmark after she had married her
second husband, plaintiff herein, with whom she continued to live after the decree was
granted and while common law marriages were still valid in New York); Ruger v. Heckel,
35 N. Y. 433 (1331) (second husband sought to attack on non-jurisdictional grounds a
New York divorce decree obtained by defendant against her first husband); Kinnier v.
Kinnier, 45 N. Y. 535 (1871) (second husband denied the right collaterally to attack
an Illinois divorce decree).
24. 270 App. Div. 527, 60 N. Y. S. (2d) 323 (2d Dep't 1946) (tvo justices dUisnting).
25. Originally, the dispute centered around the question whether common law marriages contracted in foreign jurisdictions by residents of New York would be recognized as
valid in this state after its adoption of N. Y. Laws 1933, c. 606, amending N. Y. Do=-sTic Rm-kTxio.s LAW, § 11 and outlawing common law marriages. Shea v. Shea, 263 App.
Div. 677, 52 N. Y. S. (2d) 756 (2d Dep't 1945), rev'd, 294 N. Y. 909, 63 N. E. (2d) 113
(1945). The decision in the Appellate Division was noted in 14 Form%,-r L. R1v. 93.
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which do not obtain in this State." 26 This position on New York State's public policy
was not questioned by the dissenters who relied mainly upon the argument that "The
to
appearance of the parties, in the absence of domicile, cannot confer jurisdiction 28
render the judgment." 2 7 Lengthy arguments as to which opinion is more logical
can serve no useful purpose. The salient question is whether the majority of the
court in the Shea case have accurately stated the New York law as it is today.0
Apparently there are those who believe that they have not. In Lane v. Lana,2
wherein the facts were very similar to those in the instant case, the court in granting an annulment to the defendant's second husband, said: "With due deference to
the ruling in the Shea case, in the absence of a ruling to like effect by the Appellate
Division of this department I am inclined to reach an opposite conclusion,. .",3
Furthermore, two earlier cases,31 although distinguishable from the Shea case, appear
to indicate that New York is prepared to take the position that the validity of a
foreign divorce decree even when there was voluntary personal appearance by 82both
parties, may be challenged by one who was not a party to the original action.
The position taken by the courts of this state on the constructive service cases,
i.e., permitting collateral attack by the non-appearing defendant and third parties,
appears to reflect a public policy in conformity with the attitude persistently maintained by the New York legislature toward actions for divorce.83 May the same
be said for the position taken by many courts on the personal appearance cases?
There can be little doubt that, in respect to the latter group, the right of collateral
26. 270 App. Div. 527, 532, 60 N. Y. S. (2d) 823, 828 (2d Dep't 1946), 59 HARv. L.
,.v. 983.
27. Id. at 534, 60 N. Y. S. (2d) at 830.
28. See note 15 supra.
29. N. Y. L. J., Jan. 17, 1947, p. 226, col. 3.
30. Ibid. The court went on to quote from the dissenting opinion of Lewis, P. J., In
Shea v. Shea, 270 App. Div. 526, 533, 60 N. Y. S. (2d) 823, 829 (2d Dep't 1946), which
he stated to be the sounder view.
31. Solotoff v. Solotoff, 269 App. Div. 677, 53 N. Y. S. (2d) 510 (2d Dep't 1945);
Matter of Lindgren, 293 N. Y. 18, 55 N. E. (2d) 849 (1944).
32. "We think that under facts disclosed by this record the law does not visit upon the
child the disability thus imposed upon the parents." (Italics supplied.) Matter of Lindgren,
293 N. Y. 18, 22, 55 N. E. (2d) 849, 850, 851 (1944). "The divorce action brought by the
decedent in 1939 and the subsequent appearance therein by the petitioner did not suffice
to confer upon the Florida court jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action. It has
been established in the present proceeding that neither party to that action was a domiciliary of Florida before the bill of complaint was filed. It is that lack of domicile which
deprived the foreign court of jurisdiction." (Italics supplied). Id. at 24, 55 N. E. (2d)
at 851. In Solotoff v. Solotoff, 269 App. Div. 677, 678, 53 N. Y. S. (2d) 510, 512 (2d
Dep't 1945), Hagarty, J., wrote a concurring memorandum which read, in pertinent part,
as follows: "Authority in this State such as Kinnier v. Kinnier . . . Ticdemann v. Tiedemann . . . and Glaser v. Glaser . . . proceeded under the concept, now shown to have

been mistaken . . . that acquirement of jurisdiction of the person by the court of a granting State was the dominant jurisdictional element in matrimonial actions. In the light of
the fact that jurisdiction of the subject matter may now be scrutinized . . . even consent
of a non-resident defendant will not necessarily serve to preclude inquiry into the status
of a party as a domiciliary of the granting State." See note in the second Williams case
in (1945) 14 FORDHAM L. REv. 245.
33.

N. Y. Cr. PR ACTic

ACT § 1147.
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attack has been denied without regard for the fact, expressly found even in the
instant case,34 that the marital res was not within the jurisdiction of the decreegranting state. Perhaps, as has been suggested, 35 the right of collateral attack should
be preserved to children 30 of the original pair but not to their subsequent spouses.3
The suggestion is not without merit. And yet, in the light of the unbending attitude
of the New York legislators towards divorce3s it would seem that a public policy in
harmony therewith would require the courts of this state to take the position that
no foreign divorce decree will be recognized in New York unless it appear that at
least one of the parties to that action had established a bona fide domicile in the
granting state.

FEDERAL I.Nco
TAX-CAPrrAL ASSETS-SALE OF LIFE IxTEREST IN A TRyST.By the will of her father-in-law the taxpayer was given a life interest in a trust
fund. The will provided that the income arising from the trust should not be subject to assignment or transfer by the beneficiary. The taxpayer, having been left
in a difficult financial condition, was successful in obtaining an order of a state court
approving a settlement whereby the remainderman under the trust was to pay $55,000
in consideration of the taxpayer's release of all interest in the trust and consent to
its termination. For the year in which the settlement was consummated the taxpayer reported a capital loss-the difference between the amount received and the
value of her interest in the trust. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed
the loss and made a deficiency assessment which was upheld by the Tax Court. Upon
appeal, held, one judge dissenting, the decision of the Tax Court reversed. The
transaction was a sale of a "capital asset" and the life tenant was entitled to deduct any loss resulting. McAllister v. Commissioner, 157 F. (2d) 235 (C. C. A. 2d,
1946), cert. deneed, - U. S. - (1947).
The court in the instant case was confronted with the issue of whether a cash
consideration received for a "transfer" or "surrender" of a life interest in a trust
34. " . . . the evidence is clear that both defendant and her first husband were actually residents of the State of New York at the time when the Nevada action was instituted and when the judgment of divorce therein was granted." 187 Misc. 383, 339, 63 N.
Y. S. (2d) 915 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
35. Jacobs, Attack on Decrees of Divorce (1936) 34 Micm L. Ruv. 749, 959. 97S.
36. Id. at 978.
37. Church, C. I., writing for the Court in Kinnier v. Kinnier, 45 N. Y. 535, 543 (1871),
described the plaintiff's'position as follows: "The plaintiff in this action has not been defrauded, nor is he injured by it. The plaintiff was entitled to marry a marriageable person, and though she may not have been, in other respects, all he anticipated or all that
was desirable; yet she was competent to marry, because her former marriage vas not
then in force, and being competent, it is of no legal consequence to the plaintiff how she
became so." See also Jacobs, supra, note 35, at 978.
38. See note 33 supra. Perhaps it would be well to heed the admonition of Professor
Powell, supra note 3, at 975 that, "Such views, however, are views of social policy which
are not for private individuals, however enlightened, to declare to be law. They are views
of policy which are not for judges to take the initiative in turning into law. The initiative must come from a duly accredited legislature."
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constituted "gross income"1 or receipts from the sale of "capital assets." 2 The majority of the court contends that the answer to the question involved may be found
in the case of Blair v. Commissioner,3 which held that an assignment of a right to
income in a trust is a transfer of a property right.4 Relying upon the authority of
the Blair case, the majority of the court in the instant case maintain that the
petitioner's ". . . right to income for life from the trust estate was a right in the
estate itself. . .", and that since the sale of a fee absolute certainly would have been
regarded as a transfer of a capital asset, the court asserts there is no reason for a
lesser, but still substantial, life
different result when the transfer is of a "....
interest." 5 In support of its decision, the court cites a series of cases 0 which have followed
1. "Gross income" as defined in INT. R V. CoDE § 22(a) (1939) ". . . includes gains,
profits, and income from salaries, wages, or compensation . . .from professions, vocations,
trades, businesses, commerce, or sales, or dealings in property . . . growing out of the
ownership or use of, or interest in such property; also from interest, rent, dividends, securities .. .and income derived from any source whatever."
prop2. INT. REv. CODE § 117(a) (1) (1944) defines "capital assets" as to include "...
erty held by the taxpayer . .

but does not include stock in trade . . . or other property

of a kind which would properly be included in the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand
at the close of the taxable year, or property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to
customers . . . or property, used in the trade or business . . . which is subject to the allowance for depredation . .. ."

3. 300 U. S.5 (1937), where the life beneficiary of a trust made an assignment of
interest of specified amounts to his children to be paid to them for the duration of the
estate. On the question of tax liability as to these assigned interests the Supreme Court
ruled that the assignees were taxable because they now owned corresponding beneficial
interests in the trust.
4. Id. at 13.
5. McAllister v. Commissioner, 157 F. (2d) 235, 236 (C. C. A. 2d, 1946).
6. Bell's Estate v. Commissioner, 137 F. (2d) 454 (C. C. A. 8th, 1943), reversing 46
B. T. A. 484 (1942), where a husband and wife each made separate trusts granting a
life interest to each other and a remainder to their son, and the latter purchases absolute
title to the corpus of each trust from his parents, the court held, that the parents could
list a slight capital gain because the transaction involved the sale of a "capital asset." In
the instant case, the majority of the court concede that there is a clause against alienation which was not present in the Bell case. It contends, however, that the approval of
the state court to the transfer gave complete legality to the transaction. This testing of
the validity of the assignment of a trust interest by the ruling of the state court has
been sustained by the Supreme Court. Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U. S. 5, 10 (1936);
see Uterhart v. United States, 240 U. S. 598, 603 (1915); Spindle v. Shreve, 111 U. S.
542, 547 (1883). See Note (1946) 59 HAxv. L. Rav. 948 for a review of the question of
the effect of state court decisions on federal tax liability. The Bell case was followed In
Harman v. Commissioner, 4 T. C. 335 (1944) where the petitioners had been given an
undivided life interest in coal lands by the will of their father, it was held that, on the
sale of such interests, the petitioners could compute the loss sustained in the transaction
as a sale of a "capital asset." Recently, the view of the Bell case was affirmed in the
case of First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Allen, 65 F. Supp. 128 (M. D. Ga. 1946), aff'd,
157 F. (2d) 592 (C. C. A. 5th, 1946) (on facts fundamentally similar to the Bell case);
see also Quigley v. Commissioner, 143 F. (2d) 27, 29 (C. C. A. 7th, 1944); Estate of
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the Blair holding on facts basically similar to those found in the instant case.
Among these cases is Bell's Estate v. Commissioncr,7 wherein the court held that
an assignment of a life interest in a trust was a sale of a "capital asset", and that
therefore the taxpayer could take advantage of the "capital gains" provisions of
the Internal Revenue Code. The court in the Bell case, pursuing the same line
of logic as followed in the opinion of the court in the instant case, declared that
since the Blair case has not been overruled or modified, the assignment of the life
interest of the taxpayer involved more than the transfer of . . . income or naked
rights to receive income." s
The Tax Court in its decision in the instant case,0 contended that there was a
distinction between the Bell case and the case under review, in that, in the latter
case the petitioner received the lump-sum consideration for "surrendering" her rights
to income payments and that she did not "assign" her interests as did the petitioner
in the Bell case. This court disallows such a distinction as a mere play on words.
It is ihen observed that basically the opinion of the majority of the court is
dependent upon the Blair case. The latter case has been responsible for much litigation in the law of taxation.10 Principally provocative of actions has been its
declaration as to the nature of the interest possessed by the cesttd quc trust. 11
Since the trust was first utilized as a legal mechanism, much discussion has been
devoted to the nature of the interest of a cestui que trust-is it a right in pcrsonam
or a right in rem?12 The proposition that a beneficial interest in a trust constitutes
an estate and not a mere right in personam against the trustee, has been upheld
by numerous American writers 3 and courts.14 On the other hand, several wellCamden v. Commissioner, 47 B. T. A. 926 (1942), af'd, 139 F. (2d) 697 (C. C. A. 6th,
1943); Randall v. Randall, 60 F. Supp. 303, 313 (S. D. Fla., 1944).
7. 137 F. (2d) 454 (C. C. A. Sth, 1943), (1944) 57 H.v. L. Rnv. 382. See note 6 supra.
S. Id. at 455.
9. Beulah Eaton McAllister, 5 T. C. 714, 723 (1945).
10. Note (1941)

50 YA.

L. J. 512, 518.

11. Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U. S. 579 (1941) is a case which presents an outstanding example of how the Blair decision has caused difficulty. In that case the right to
income was assigned for a year. Strictly adhering to the Blair case, the court would be
compelled to put tax liability in the assignee. However, the court refused to make such
an application on the basis that the period involved in the Sclaffner case was too short.
See also Huber v. Helvering, 117 F. (2d) 782 (App. D. C. 1941).
12. The conflicting views are categorized in two excellent law review articles: Stone,
The Nature of the Rights of the Cestui Que Trust (1917) 17 CoL. L. Rrv. 467; Scott,
The Nature of the Rights of the Cestui Trust (1917) 17 CoL. L. Rev. 269. See aizo
HoLmFs, Tim CoararoN LAW (1531) 407.
13. 1 ScoTT, TRusTs (1939) § 132; 1 PERRY, TRusrs ,m Tnusmrzs (7th ed. 1929)
§ 321; 1 BOrERT, TRrsTS Am TRus=rzz (1935) § 183; REsmAmm-rT, TRUST- (1935)

§§ 130, 132.
14. The leading case is Brown v. Fletcher, 235 U. S. 539, 599 (1914), where, in interpreting a statute which prohibited the Federal court from entertaining actions brought by
assignees to recover upon a chose in action, the Supreme Court held that the statute
did not apply to an assignment of a beneficial interest in a trust because it was more
than "... . a bare right and much more than a chose in action." Accord: Senior v. Braden,
295 U. S. 422, 432 (1935); Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Patter-on, 303 M11.519, 139
N. E. 912, 916 (1923); Stringer v. Young, 191 N. Y. 157, 165, 83 N. E. 69D, 693 (1903).
See also Note (1915)

28 HARv. L. Riv. 507.
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known legal writers insist that the cestui que trust merely has a claim, a chose in
action, against the trustee to have the trust carried out-purely a right in personam.1 It must be conceded that the courts have been inclined to follow the
in rem theory. The Supreme Court announced in an early case10 that the rights
of a trust estate "... shall be governed by the same rules as legal estates." This
property conception of the beneficial interest in a trust was utilized in the Blair
case to distinguish its holding from the case of Lucas v.' Earl,17 in which it was
held that an assignment of the right to receive "income" did not relieve the assignor
of liability to pay taxes. In the Blair case, where the taxpayer made an assignment
of his life interest in a trust, the Supreme Court held that this was not an ". . . assignment of a chose in action but of the 'right, title and estate in and to property'. . .", and therefore, tax liability became attached to the ownership of the beneficial interest which was in the assignees.' 8 From these decisions there was derived the formula, that where the mere right to future income is assigned, the tax
liability is with the assignor but where property producing income is assigned, the
liability is with the assignee. 10
That the language and formula of the Blair case has been limited strictly to its
facts has been borne out by the decision in the case of Harrison v. Schaffler,20 in
which the Supreme Court held that an assignment of specified amounts from the
income of a trust for the year following the assignment did not absolve the assignor
of the duty to pay tax ort such income. In that case, the court refused to apply
15. MAITLAND, EQUITY (rev. ed. 1936) 117; HOLLAND, JURISPRUDENCE (11th ed. 1916)
247. Ames has stated that the cestui que trust merely owns the ". . . obligation of the
trustee . . .", and to call him an equitable owner of property is ". . . clearly inaccurate."
Ames, Purchase for Value Without Notice (1887) 1 HARv. L. REv. 1, 9. Note also the
statement made by another authority: "Upon the whole, it may be said that equity could
not create rights in ren if it would, and that it would not if it could." Langdell, A Brief
Survey of Equity Jurisdiction (1887) 1 HARv. L. REv. 55, 60.
16. Freedman's Savings & Trust Co. v. Earle, 110 U. S. 710, 713 (1884).
17. 281 U. S. 111, 115 (1930), noted in 43 HARv. L. REv. 1282. In this case, the taxpayer agreed with his wife that all future earnings, including salaries and fees, received
were to be held and earned by them as joint tenants. The court refused to recognize this
contract and held that the ". . . tax could not be escaped by anticipatory arrangements
and contracts however skillfully devised to prevent the salary when paid from vesting
even for a second in the man who earned it." This principle governing the assignment
of income was approved in Corlies v. Bowers, 281 U. S. 376, 378 (1930), where Justice
Holmes held that ". . . income that is subject to a man's unfettered command . . . may be
taxed to him as his income, whether he sees fit to enjoy it or not." Accord: Burnet v.
Leininger, 285 U. S. 136 (1932); Leydig v. Commissioner, 43 F. (2d) 494 (C. C. A. 10th,
1930). For a good discussion of the problem see Surrey, Assignments of Income and Related Devices: Choice of the Taxable Person (1933) 33 COL. L. REv. 791. Compare the
above decision of the cases with the holdings of Helvering v. Horst, 311 U. S. 112 (1940),
and Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U. S. 112 (1940), where the court held that, even though
the taxpayer had relinquished all command over the property assigned, he was liable for
taxes on the income derived from such property because of the "satisfaction" accruing
to him.. See 2 MFRTEws, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATON (1942) § 18.02.
18. Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U. S. 5, 13, 14 (1937).

19. Application of rule is discussed in 2 PAUL AND MERTENS, LAW or FEDERAL INCOME
TAxATiaxo (1934) § 15.03; (1945) 14 FoReHA-Ar L. REV. 119.

20. 312 U. S. 579 (1940) noted in (1941) 54 HARv. L. Rxv. 1905. See note 11 supra.
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the Blair decision stating that the operation of "... statutes taxing income is not
dependent upon such 'attenuated subtleties' but rather on the import and reasonable construction of the taxing act." 2' It appears, therefore, that courts will discard formulae derived from prior rulings of the courts to reach a decision responsive to the facts of the particular case presently under analysis. 2 The majority of
the court in the instant case points out that the application by the Supreme Court
of the Blair holding to the facts of the Sckafftnr case exemplifies the necessity of
making certain distinctions, such as differentiating between ".

.

. anticipation of

income payments over a reasonably short period of time and an out-and-out transfer of a substantial and durable property interest, such as a life estate at least is."M
Upon the nature of this distinction, the majority of the court yielded to the Blatr
case rather than apply the decision of Hort v. Corn nissioner,-Ithe case upon which
the dissenting judge relied.
In the Hort case, wherein the taxpayer, for a consideration, agreed to cancel a
lease for a term of years having nine years to run, it was held that actually the
payment was merely a substitute of the rent reserved in the lease and, therefore,
that the consideration received for cancellation of the lease was not "a return of
capital" even assuming the lease was "property". - In his dissenting opinion in the
instant case, Judge Frank suggests that the tort decision indicates that the policy
of the courts is to look with disfavor upon transactions ".

.

. by which trans-

ferors have procured advance payments of future income" and that the courts have
refused to regard them as capital transactions.20 The majority of the court, how21.

Id. at 581.

22. For example, note the case of Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U. S. 122 (1940), where
a life insurance agent, after a termination of his agency contracts, made assignments of
renewal commissions which had been earned but were payable at a future date; the
Commi-soner assessed the renewal commissions paid by the insurance company to assignee
as income taxable to the assignor. It was held that this was merely an assignment of a
right to receive income and should be taxable to assignor because of the economic satisfaction received. Again, in the case of Helvering v. Hors t 311 U. S. 112 (1940), where de-

tached negotiable interest coupons were assigned to donee shortly before due date, the
court refused to hold that this was an assignment of property-producing income and
held the donor taxable. In these two cases, it was strenuously contended in dis-enting

opinions that the court was refusing to apply the formula of the Blair case: that where
property-producing income (rather than the bare right to income) is assigned, tax liaDility attaches to the owner of such property.
23. McAllister v. Commissioner, 157 F. (2d) 235, 237 (C. C. A. 3d, 1946).
24. 313 U. S. 2S (1941). The taxpayer in this case failed to report the sum of money
received for cancellation of the lease as gross income; instead, he listed a loss-the difference between the present value of unmatured rents and fair rental value for the un-

expired term. The court termed the money received "income", and held it taxable as
such. On a similar question, see Warren Service Corp. v. Commissioner, 110 F. (2d) 723
(C. C. A. 2d, 1940); Josey v. Commissioner, 104 F. (2d) 453 (C. C. A. 10th, 1939).
25. Id. at 31. It is declared in the court's opinion, that for purpose of revenue statutes,
and even in common usage, "property" and "capital" are not necessarily synonymous.
26. See Helvering v. Smith, 90 F. (2d) 590, 592 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937), where a retiring
partner who had contributed no capital to the partnership received cash consideration for
a so called "purchase" of his share of earnings to be received in the future for past ser-

vices. It was held that "The 'purchase' of that future income did not turn into capital,
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ever, in weighing the Blair and Hort decisions, declares that the "line of demarcation" between the cases is not clear, but that it will defer to the former because of
the obvious distinction between the sale of a life estate in property and "...
antici27
pating income for a few years in advance."
The court's contention that to rule otherwise in the instant case would be to overrule the Supreme Court decision in the Blair case is met by the dissenting judge's
argument that in the Blair case the court was not called upon to decide the application of Section 117 of the Internal Revenue Code.as Judge Frank, in his dissenting opinion, emphasized the proposition that the language of the Blair case in
construing the "gross income" provisions20 may not apply necessarily 30 to an
& 31
interpretation of the "capital gains" sections of the Code.
The conflicting views stated herein indicate the difficult problem under analysis.
Both opinions demonstrate a realistic approach to the question, but it appears that
the dissenting opinion cuts more deeply through legalistic distinctions when it
declares that the consideration received by the taxpayer for the sale of her interest
was truly an advance payment of income, and that it should be taxable as income.
The latter holding follows from the proposition that fundamentally the right of a
beneficiary of an' income-producing trust is the right to receive income and that
any more than the discount of a note received in consideration of personal services";
Sutton v. Commissioner, 95 F. (2d) 845 (C. C. A. 10th, 1938), where an attorney agreed
to take mineral rights for services to be rendered by him and later arranged a settlement
with the client whereby he received a sum of money in lieu of the mineral rights, It was
held that the entire sum was taxable as ordinary income; Swastika Oil & Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 40 B. T. A. 789 (1939), aff'd, 123 F. (2d) 382 (C. C. A. 6th, 1941), wherein It
was ruled that payment teceived as a result of a settlement of claims for certain profits
and other properties of which the taxpayer had been fraudulently deprived in prior years
was taxable as income for the year in which payments were received: Escher v. Commissioner, 78 F. (2d) 815 (C. C. A. 3d, 1935), where an attorney agreed in lieu of payment
for past services in connection with recovery of stock claimed by client to take ten per
cent of amount received for sale of stock, it was held that money recovered from sale
was taxable as income; see also Ansorge v. Commissioner, 147 F. (2d) 459 (C. C. A. 2d,
1945). In Rhodes' Estate v. Commissioner, 131 F. (2d) 50 (C. C. A, 6th, 1942), where a
taxpayer owning shares of stock sold dividend rights before dividend was payable, the court
held that the amount received by taxpayer was taxable income.
27. McAllister v. Commissioner, 157 F. (2d) 235, 237 (C. C. A. 2d, 1946). This distinction, made in the instant case, has been approved in the latest decision In which the
immediate problem has been met. Allen v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. In Macon, 157
F. (2d) 592 (C. C. A. 5th, 1946).
28. IN . REv. CODE § 117 (1944); see note 2 supra.
29. laT. REV. CODE § 22(a) (1939) ; see note 1 supra.

30. Judge Frank has criticized the rule that a word or symbol has only a single
referent "regardless of context." United States v. Forness, 125 F. (2d) 928, 932 (C. C. A.
2d, 1942). The same point is made in some of his other opinions: Rohmer v. Commissioner, 153 F. (2d) 61, 65 (C. C. A. 2d, 1946); Irwin v. Simmons, 140 F. (2d) 558, 560
(C. C. A. 2d, 1944) ; United Shipyards v. Hoey, 131 F. (2d) 525, 526 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942).
Language in juristic interpretations has been the subject of much debate. See CIAs.,
T

oi WoRDs (1938) ; Obiter Dicta, More Words on Words (1941)

10 FORDnAX L.

REv. 453. For a criticism of the extreme view of the Semanticists see Kennedy, A Review
of Legal Realism (1940) 9 FoRnEmr L. Rav. 362, 371.
31. See notes 2 and 28 supra.
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the other rights are merely ancillary to that primary right.3 2 Proponents of this
view warn that defining the right of the cestui que trust as a right i rem is misleading.33 Even though some of the remedies of a cestui que trust have characteristics in common with those given a holder of legal estate, yet, as indicated by the
late Chief Justice Stone, the nature of the remedies available do not fix definitively
the nature of the right. 34
Even if it is established that the beneficial interest in a trust has developed into
a substantial property right, further difficulty of the problem is not obviated in
the light of the Hort decision, and the policy of the courts in some instances to
ignore rules of property in order to arrive at the result desired by Congress in enacting income tax laws. 30 The Hort case, as already indicated, proposed that it was immaterial that, for some purposes other than taxation, rights under a lease are considered "property" or "capital", because for purposes of taxation, the court will declare the consideration paid for release of the rights to future rentals advance payment of income and taxable as such. True, it may be stated, as reasoned by the
majority of the court, that the Hort case is not applicable where you have a transfer of a substantial property right such as a life estate. The latter contention has
its merits and, it might be safe to say, would be cogent were it not for several historic decisions handed down by the Supreme Court in recent years. For example,
in Helverhig v. Hallock,37 the Supreme Court (in deciding an estate tax question)
declared that it ". . . refused to subordinate the plain purposes of a modem fiscal
measure to the wholly unrelated origins of the recondite learning of ancient property law." Such language called forth a vigorous dissenting opinion,33 yet its
tenor has been approved by some leading tax analystsPO as well as by students of
jurisprudence. 40 The Hallock case was soon followed by the ever-provohing case
32. M.~mG,TA-XABI. INco= (1936) 266. The leading case of Irwin v. Gavit, 263
U. S. 161 (1925), gave recognition to this proposition when it held that, although the
cestui que trust had an estate in the trust fund, he had primarily the right to income and
such income, as distinguished from the actual trust fund, was subject to tax. See aLo
Note (1941) 50 YALE L. 3. 512, 516.
33. Stone, The Nature of the Rights of the Cestui Que Trust (1917) 17 Cot. L. Rrv.
467, 473. See note 15 supra.
34. Id. at 46S.

35. See notes 24 and 25 supra.
36. See notes 37 and 41 infra.
37. 309 U. S. 106, 112 (1940). In this case the Supreme Court over-ruled the decisions
of Helvering v. St. Louis Trust Co., 296 U. S. 39 (1935) and Becher v. St. Louis Trust
Co., 296 U. S. 4S (1935), when it held that an interest limited upon a reversion and subject to a condition precedent of surviving the grantor must be included in his gross estate;
conceding there was a contingent remainder, the court, nevertheless, declared in reality
it was a transfer of an estate at death and subject to the estate tax. See also Klein v.
United States, 283 U. S.231, 234 (1931).
38. Justice Roberts held this decision ". . . an altogether unwise and unjustified exertion of power . . ." because it overruled precedents upon which taxpayers have relied.

Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106, 129, 130 (1940).
39. 2 PAUL, Froxasl ESTATE AD Grrr TT.xaON (1942) 1173, where the author jubilantly declared "Coke's ghost" no longer "haunted" the estate tax field. Another writer
has dassified its results as "reasonable." Magill, Federal Taxation in the Pre-War Decade
(1942) 42 CoL. L. R1v. 356, 36S.
40. Note the comment of the late Professor Kennedy who deemed this case an exampie of the Supreme Court's ". . . skepticism regarding the validity or permanency of pernicious abstractions of sterile concepts, handed down the ages without any reconsideration
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of Helvering v. Clifford,41 where the court, again repudiating "Technical considerations

. .

." and "... . niceties of the law of trusts or conveyances

. . .", held

a grantor

of a trust taxable on the income because for all practical purposes the grantor
by his control over the trust was still considered the owner of the carpus.
It cannot be doubted but that in the quest to prevent tax-evasive devices and to
make secure the constitutional right of Congress to enact necessary tax measures,
42"
the courts have left phases of the law of income taxation in a doubtful condition.
The instant case falls within this area of uncertainty because, as evidenced by the
conflicting views, there is a property conception which has been recognized by the
courts vying with the policy of realistic and economic interpretation of tax matters
whicE has prevailed in some recent decisions. In other terms the problem might
be reduced to the question of whether the Blair case and its holding that a life
interest in a trust is a property estate, is on a sufficiently firm basis 43 so as to
withstand the policy of the Supreme Court of giving full effect to the wide scope
of income taxation as intended and legislated by Congress in Section 22(a) of
the Internal Revenue Code.44 In the light of the administrative difficulties that
have ensued from decisions wherein the courts have deferred to the broad language
of that section (and it is suggested that the decision in the case under review may
meet such a fate) it is proposed that the legislature take notice of the problem and
of their present-day value." Kennedy, The Bethlehem Steel Case-A Test of the New
Constitutionalism (1942) 11 FoRDrAm, L. Rxv. 133, 136, 137.
41. 309 U. S. 331, 334 (1940), where the grantor set up a trust for his wife for a
five year period with a reversion in himself, and under the arrangement exercised much
control over the trust fund. The court ignored the form to get at the substantial effect'
of the transaction, and held the grantor taxable on the income arising from the trust.
42. The confusion that trailed the Clifford case stands as available evidence of the
results of such policy. As one writer observed, ". . . at what point legal rights deteriorated
into legal paraphernalia was an intriguing problem left to future adjudication. . . That a
melee of vexatious litigation would ensue should have surprised no one." Lynch, The
Treasury Interprets the Clifford Case (1946) 15 FoRDnAm L. REv. 161, 162. See also:
MAGILL, TiE IwPAcT or FEDERAL TAXEs (1943) 209; PAUL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATIo:
Tnm SERIES (1940) 294.
no longer controlling." Groher,
43. One judge has stated that the Blair case is "...
C. J., in his concurring opinion in Huber v. Helvering, 117 F. (2d) 782, 785 (App. D. C.
1941). The distinction made by the Blair case as to the difference and effect between the
assignment of a right to income and an interest in a trust have been said to be no longer
on firm ground. Pavenstedt, The Broadened Scope of Section 22(a); The Evolution of
The Clifford Doctrine (1941) 51 YALE L. J. 213, 243. Another authority has admitted that
the distinction is "shadowy" but added that the Revenue Act took cognizance of property concepts. Buck, Income Tax Evasion and Avoidance: The Deflection of Income
(1936) 23 VA. L. REv. 107, 138. Since this article was written via the Hallock and Clifford
cases, the Supreme Court has rendered the author's statement questionable.
44. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the scope of the ,language of the income tax sections indicated the intention of Congress to use the full extent of its powers
to tax income, and that it would not confine the legislation to a narrower interpretation
than indicated by the language of the statute: Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U. S. 154, 169
(1942) ; Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331, 334 (1940); Helvering v. Midland Ins. Co.,
300 U. S. 216, 223 (1936); Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U. S. 1, 9 (1935); Irwin v. Gavit,
268 U. S. 161, 166 (1925); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 203 (1920).
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give clarity to its intent. Only in this manner can confusion be removed and the
rights and duties of the taxpayer in regard to the government and its legitimate
taxing powers be fairly established.

GRAND JURY-SECPECY OF-EFECT OF PRESENCE OF AN UM;AUTHORIZED PERs0O.-

The defendant was indicted for rape and convicted. The complainant had been accompanied before the grand jury by her sister. As a result the defendant moved to
dismiss the indictment under Section 313 of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure which provides for dismissal when an unauthorized person is present before
the grand jury which is considering a charge. Held, two justices dissenting, that the
legal rights of the defendant were not violated nor prejudiced, since at most there
had been only a technical violation of Section 313 and not one which would render
the indictment invalid. People v. 3finet, 271 App. Div. 345, 66 N. Y. S. (2d) 391

(4th Dep't 1946).
The forerunner of our present day grand jury was the "jury of presentment."' In
England, even before the enactment of the Assize of Clarendon in 1166,2 these juries
were employed principally to discover and present facts in answer to inquiries addressed to them by the king.3 It is probable that the regular use of the grand jury
dates from this statute4 which provided that a jury from each county should make
inquiries to determine if, in their county, there be any man accused or generally suspected of having committed a crime.5
1. See Inquiito Eliensis, cited in SrTUBBs, SELtEcr CMrrns (6th ed. 1913) 86 showing
one of the earliest known uses of the jury as an inquisitorial body. William the Conqueror in 10SI ordered that twelve men of every "hundred" and six men of every manor
be chosen to assist in the compilation of the Domesday-Book.; see also 2 BL. Coz..r.
49, 50.
2. This statute was enacted during the reign of Henry II of England as part of
his general scheme for a reform of the law.; see 1 HotnswoRTrr, HxsTon" or Tm E!c;.
LAw (4th ed. 1927) 321; CARTzR, THE LAW (1st ed. 1907) 63; se note 4 infra.
3. "The ancestors of our 'grand jurors' are from the first neither exactly accusers, nor
exactly witnesses; they are to give voice to the common repute." 2 PoL1rs & U TA1TrA,
OF Tim ENG. LAw (2d ed. 1923) 642.
HisTro
4. The assize of Clarendon began with a general recital that the statute was passsd
to preserve peace and keep justice and then continued: "Inquiry should be made on oath
in every county and in every hundred, by twelve legal men of the hundred and by four
legal men of every manor, whether anyone had been accused of being a robber, or a murderer, or a thief, or a harbourer of same since the king was king." Ass. Clar. Ch. 1 & 2;
see BIrrErow, HisTORy OF ExG. PROC. (1st ed. ISSO) 99.
S. For complete text of the statute see SrTUsS, SELeCr Cmisrsm (6th ed. 1913) 143146; It can be seen that the grand jury was founded to aid the king's repre.entatives in
the administration of justice. The jurors, as residents of the county, were mo:t familiar
with the people and the occurrences there and were considered the best qualified to inquire
and determine whether or not a crime had been committed and to determine if some member of their community was suspected of that crime. "The grand jury was established to
secure to the subject a right of appeal to his peers, under the immunity of secrecy and
irresponsibility, before the government could bring him to trial. It was a right wrung from
the government to secure the subject against oppression." People v. Naughton, 38 Hor.
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From the very beginning the sessions of the grand jury were secret and this right
was jealously guarded. 6 Secrecy was recognized as being necessary to enable the
jurors efficiently and justly to carry out the purpose for which they were established.
It serves (1) to prevent the escape of persons charged with crime, (2) to promote
freedom of deliberation and opinion, (3) to prevent coercion of grand jurors and
the good names of persons considered, but not indicted
witnesses and (4) to keep
7
from being besmirched.
Whether an indictment should be declared invalid because of the presence of an
0
unauthorized person in the grand jury room is unsettled.8 Statutes in New York
and throughout the country' 0 have expressly designated who may be present before
the grand jury while a }witness is testifying and have limited their number to the
prosecuting attorney, his assistants, and the official stenographer." The majority of
430 (N. Y. 1870) ; quoted with approval, In re Gardiner, 31 Misc. 364, 64 N. Y. Supp. 760
(Ct. Gen. Sess. 1900); for an excellent discussion of the purpose and origin of the grand
jury, see the oft-quoted summary of Chief Justice Field, In re Charge to the Grand Jury,
2 Sawy. 667 (C. C. A. Cal. 1872) where he said, the grand jury was instituted "... as a
means not only' of bringing to trial persons accused of public offenses upon just grounds,
but also as a means of protecting the citizens against unfounded accusation, whether it
came from government or be prompted by partisan passion or private enmity."
6. Ward Baking Co. v. West. Union Tel. Co., 205 App, Div. 723, 200 N. Y. Supp. 865
(3rd Dep't 1923); In 1 GREENLErA, EVIDENCE (11th ed. 1863) § 252 et seq., public policy
is given as the basis for the secrecy of the grand jury; for a present day discussion on the
point, see WIGMORE,
THE ENG.

EVIDENCE

(3rd ed. 1940) § 2360; see also 1 HoLDsWoRTU, HISTORY OF

LAW (4th ed. 1927) 324; cf. Schmidt v. United States, 115 F. (2d) 394 (C. C.

A. 6th, 1940).

7. The secrecy of the proceedings before the grand jury are always zealously guarded
and preserved in order to promote freedom in the disclosure of crimes, to prevent perjury
and subornation of perjury by the accused in attempting to prove the evidence by false
testimony and to avoid the danger of the accused escaping before being arrested. People
v. Dunbar Contracting Co., 82 Misc. 174, 143 N. Y. Supp. 337 (Sup. Ct. 1913).
8. In United States v. Edgerton, 80 Fed. 374 (D. Mont. 1897) it was held that no other
person than the witness undergoing examination and the government attorney can be
present and where an expert witness remained in the grand jury room while another witness was being examined and questioned him, the indictment should be quashed. However, in Mason v. State, 46 Tex. iCr. App. 572, 81 S. W. 718 (1904) the court held that
the fact that one witness was present in the grand jury room while the other was testifying was no ground for quashing the indictment; see also Wilson v. State, 70 Miss. 595, 13
So. 225 (1893). For a discussion of the conflict on the point see United States v. Rockfeller, 221 Fed. 462 (S. D. N. Y. 1914); United States v. Heinze, 177 Fed. 770 (C. C. S. D.
N. Y. 1910); United States v. Rosenthal, 121 Fed. 862 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1903).
9. N. Y. CODE CR. PROC. § 313; see also §§ 262, 263, 264.
10. FED. RrLEs OF CRM. PROC. Rule 6(d); IowA CODE OF Camx. PRoc. § 5319; TEXAS
CODE C~am. PROC. Art. 506; UTAH CODE or CRaM. PROC. § 105.

11.
In United States v. Simmons, 46 Fed. 65 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1891) it was held
that the presence of a stenographer was legal on the ground that he was an assistant to
the District Attorney. Later, in United States v. Rockfeller, 221 Fed. 462 (S. D. N. Y.
1914), this view was affirmed, but in United States v. Goldman, 28 F. (2d) 424 (D. Conn.
1928) it was held that under the authority of 5 U. S. C. A. § 310 (1906) that the presence in the jury room of a stenographer would invalidate the indictment although he
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our courts, however, have taken the view that the solemn findings of the grand jury
should not be set aside for light or trivial reasons and that, unless prejudice to
&2
the rights of the defendant is shown, the indictment should not be quashed.
Judges are loath to delay justice or to allow criminals to take advantage of a technicality in the law and thereby escape the consequences of their act. On the other
hand, the minority base their rule upon the concept that the setting of such a
precedent can be dangerous in that it would imperil the structure of the grand jury
and could destroy all the common law and statutory protection placed around the
operation of that body. 13 The minority hold that the secrecy of the grand jury is a
protection for complaining witnesses, the jurors themselves, those charged or accused and society as a whole. 14 The dissenting opinion in the instant case points out
that unauthorized persons may, by their presence alone exercise a coercive force on
the minds of the jurors and the witness testifying.10
In State v. W1ood'6 under a statute similar to the one under consideration, the
court held that the indictment should not be quashed where a father and daughter
were summoned to appear as witnesses before the grand jury, and where because
the daughter was nervous and fearful, her father was permitted upon his request to
be present during the time she was giving her testimony and there was no showing
that he did anything to influence the witness or that the defendant was in any way
prejudiced. In United States v. Edgerton,17 the leading federal case on the point,
the opposite view was taken. In that case Judge Bellinger said, "It is beyond question that no other person than a witness undergoing examination and the attorney
for the government, can he present during the sessions of the grand jury. The rule
was appointed as a temporary assistant to the District Attorney. The court held that for
a stenographer to be present he must be a regular clerk and assistant to the District Attorney, appointed by the Attorney General and required to take the official oath and have
prescribed duties and tenure. In 1946, the United States Supreme Court incorporated
into the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure the following: "Rule 6 (d) Who may be present. Attorneys for the government, the witness under examination, interpreters when needed, and for the purpose of taking the evidence, a stenographer may be present while the
grand jury is in session, but no person other than the jurors may be present while the
grand jury is deliberating or voting." For cases upholding the legality of the precence of
stenographers see State v. Bates, 143 Ind. 610, 43 N. E. (2d) (1897); Courtney v. State,
5 Ind. App. 356, 32 N. E. 335 (1S92); State v. Sullivan, 110 Mo. App. 75, 84 S. W. 105
(1904) ; State v. Brewster, 70 Vt. 341, 40 AUt. 1037 (1S9S).
12. State v. Wood, 112 Iowa 4S4, S4 N. W. 503 (1C00); State v. Bacon, 77 Mizz. 366,
27 So. 563 (1900); State v. Justus, 11 Ore. 17S, 8 Pac. 337 (1833); see also 2 Joycz,
INric'T.=TTs (2d ed. 1924) 175.
13. United States v. Edgerton, SO Fed. 374 (D. Mont. 1897).
14. Latham v. United States, 226 Fed. 420 (C. C. A. 5th, 1915).
15. Justice Love, in the dissenting opinion in the instant case, cites an unreported case
which arose in Richmond County N. Y. in 1839, where Mr. Justice Cullen granted a
motion dismissing the indictment where the same question was involved.
16.

112 Iowa 484, 84 N. W. 503 (1900) ; for a recent case reiterating the same rule see

Sanders v. State, 19S Miss. 587, 22 So. (2d) SOD (1945).
17. 80 Fed. 374 (D. Mont. 1897); see also Meyers v. Weber County, - Utah -, 156
P. (2d) 711 (1945) where it was held that the mere presence of an unauthorized person
before the grand jury, without a showing of prejudice would be sufficient to render the
indictment void.
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is inherent in the grand jury system with all the force of a statutory enactment. . . . The rule, in its spirit and purpose, admits of no exception. . . If the
presence of an unauthorized person in the grand jury room may be excused, who
will set bounds to the abuse to follow such a breach of the safeguards which surround the grand jury?" In Latharn v. United States,'8 the mere presence of the district attorney's clerk and stenographer taking notes of the testimony of witnesses
was held a violation of the defendant's rights.
The minority view on this subject would seem more sound. If we are to retain the
grand jury system, we should not leave the door open for abuses which may creep
in and undermine its structure. The statute -in this case and similar ones in other
jurisdictions were enacted to give protection to the common law concept of the
secrecy of the grand jury. The obvious intent of our law-making bodies should not
be disregarded. While it is true that a strict interpretation of the statute will allow
some criminals temporarily to escape punishment, it is better that this happen than
to set up a precedent that may in the future convert our grand jury from a shield
to a sword. The rule of the court in the instant case is based on convenience. Rather
than see a guilty criminal escape they would permit inroads on grand jury secrecy.
"Such a rule . . ." as Justice Love says in his capable dissent, ". . . could result in
the presence of all lay persons, whether they knew anything about the case or not,
all police officers, detectives and sheriffs, all clergymen, citizens and newspapermen
interested in crusades, exposes, and accusations by the mere device of taking an
oath."'1 There is now a movement in New York to strengthen grand jury secrecy.
Under present law, witnesses 'who have testified before the grand jury may reveal
their testimony. 20 In this way the evidence before the grand jury may be ascertained and made the basis of a motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground of2
2
21
the inadequacy and incompetence of such evidence. Under proposed legislation,
witnesses before the grand jury would be required to take an oath of secrecy.
18. 226 Fed. 420 (C. C. A. 5th, 1915) where the court held that even if no prejudice
was shown the act of June 1906, 5 U. S. C. A. 310 did not authorize such presence. In
this case the court upheld the rule of the minority and said that the right of the citizen
is invaded by the participation of an unauthorized person whether that participation was
great or small.
19. See also Commonwealth v. Harris, 231 Mass. 584, 121 N. E. 409 (1919) where It
was said that any procedure whereby the grand jury examines witnesses in presence
of witnesses, bystanders or judges ". . . destroys the principle of the oath which enjoins
the grand jury to keep secret, 'the commonwealth's counsel, your fellow's, and your
own.'"
20. No secrecy is imposed upon a witness before the grand jury, either to the fact of
his being called or as to his testimony before them. People v. Naughton, 38 How. 430
(N. Y. 1870).
21. Though § 313 of the N. Y. CODE OF CR. PRoc. does not provide as a ground for dismissal that the evidence was insufficient or that illegal evidence was introduced, one indicted has a constitutional right to a dismissal of an indictment on such grounds. People
v. Sexton, 187 N. Y. 495, 80 N. E. 396 (1907).
22. See S. Int. No. 957, by Senator M. Mitchell; A. Int. No. 1065, by Assemblyman
Reoux.
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LABOR LAW-EMPLOYER'S RIGHT or FREE SPEECH LN LABOR RELATi0o:S.-Mter

nine months of intensive union campaigning and one week prior to an election conducted to determine the right of the union to represent employees as their sole
bargaining agent, the employer Company summoned its employees in small groups
to leave their work and attend addresses by the Company's Labor Relations Manager. During the course of each of these speeches, this representative of the Company reported charges made against the Company in a union publication, referred
to a pending suit by the Company against the union for libel and stated that the
Company was "unalterably opposed" to a closed shop, but emphasized that the
Company recognized the employee's right to collective bargaining and thrtt the
Company would abide by the election. On unfair labor practice charges filed by
the union the Board sustained the trial examiner and ordered the Company to cease
and desist from unfair labor practices. On a petition by the Board for enforcement of its-order, held, order denied, N. L. R. B. v. Montgomery Ward and Co.,
157 F. (2d) 486 (C. C. A. 8th, 1946).
Viewed in perspective this latest judicial pronouncement on the subject of employer freedom of speech in aabor relations is only a cumulative contribution to the
law on that subject. For many years prior to the instant case the major issue involving the extent to which an employer is entitled to rely upon the "free speech"
guaranty of the Constitution1 had been litigated in the national forum. Since the
Virgi Electric & Power Co. case,2 decided by the Supreme Court in 1941, swept
away any remaining doubts as to the right of employers to invoke the protection
of the First Amendment in expressing their views in labor problems, the main concern of the courts has been in determining when an appeal to that constitutional
guaranty is in reality a cloak for abusive action and a deprivation of the right
granted to employees by the Wagner Act 4 to be free from coercive pressure in their
industrial relations. The decision under consideration is notable to the extent that
it attempts to define in a given circumstance the permissible scope of the employer's privilege.
A decade of litigation as to what constitutes speech by an employer depriving his
employees of the right guaranteed to them by the Wagner Act 0 has developed two
fundamental categories of unfair labor practice based upon an employer's illegal
statements on the subject of industrial relations. The first of these approaches is
generally founded upon an assertion that the utterances of an employer are coarcive
1. U. S. CoxsT. A ara,. I. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the Freedom
of Speech, or of the press, . . . "
2. In N. L. R. B. v. Nhr'ginia Electric & Power Co., 314 U. S. 469 (1941) the Supreme
Court affirmed the right of an employer to express his views on labor policies or problems in the absence of a background of coercion.
3. See Continental Box Co., Inc. v. N. L. R. B., 113 F. (2d) 93, 96, 97 (C. C. A. 5th,
1940) ; . L. R. B. v. Federbush Co., Inc., 121 F. (2d) 954, 956, 957 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941).
4.

49 STAT. 452, 29 U. S. C. A. § 158 (1942) provides that ".

..

it shall be an unfair

labor practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees . . ." in the
exercise of their rights to organize and bargain collectively.
5. For full discussions of the development of the subject see Comment (1945) 14
FoRaDTAx L. Rnv. 59; Comment (1946) 34 CAX.w L. REv. 415; Daykin, The Emrnloyer's
Right and Free Speech in Industry Under the National Labor Relations Act (1945) 40 IL.
L. Rav. 185; Morgan, Employer's Freedom of Speech and the Wagner Act (1945) 20
TLANE L. REv. 469.
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per se. Name-calling, 6 threats of discharge, 7 threats to shut down the plant,8 threats
to move the plant, 9 threats to evict from company owned houses' o and promises
of especial favor to those repudiating the union 1 are all typical of conduct sufficient
in itself to justify a conclusion of illegality. Because of the clearly offensive nature
of such activity and the multiplicity of decisions on specific instances of illegal expression the problem can no longer be considered an important source of contention
in judicial interpretation of permissible employer conduct under the Wagner Act.
The second type of assertion in suits alleging unfair labor practices is of its nature
more subtle since it rests upon claims directed at employer utterances which, although not in themselves offensive, assume a coercive character when viewed in the
light of attendant circumstances. 12 Necessarily a charge founded on what has conveniently been called the "totality of conduct"' 3 requires delicate evaluation of the
force of such intangibles as the probable force of covert suggestions, the tenor
of the parties past industrial relations and the likely emotional reaction of employees to the "stimuli" of the circumstances under which the utterances were
14
made.
The petition of the Board in the instant case alleges an unfair labor practice of
the latter type and claims that the over-all effect of the employer's conduct amounted to an abusive exercise of its constitutional right to free speech. Specifically
the Board contended that a) the timing of the speech b) their content and c) the
circumstances surrounding the utterances when taken in conjunction with certain
other alleged unfair practices 15 of the employer, committed both prior and subsequent to the speeches, amounted to interference, restraint and coercion.
6. Such abusive epithets as "Racketeers," N. L. R. B. v. Federbush, 121 F. (2d) 93,
95 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941.); In re Sterling Corset Co., Inc., 9 N. L. R. B. 858, 862 (1938),
"... agitators, spies, traitors, saboteurs . . ."; In re Donnelley & Sons Co., 60 N. L. R. B.

635 (1945) are typical examples of language objectionable on its face.
7. N. L. R. B. v. Auburn Foundry, Inc., 119 F. (2d) 331 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941); In re
Burke Machine Tool Co., 36 N. L. R. B. 1329 (1941); In re Oregon Worsted Co., 1
N. L. R. B. 915 (1936).
8. N. L. R. B. v. Asheville Hosiery Co., 108 F. (2d) 288 (C. C. A. 4th, 1939); N. L.
R. B. v. Jahn & Olier Engraving Co., 123 F. (2d) 589 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941); N. L,R. B.
v. P. Lorillard Co., 117 F. (2d) 921 (C. C. A. 6th, 1941).
9. In re Anwelt Shoe Mfg. Co., 1 N. L. R. B. 939 (1936).
10. In re Good Coal Co., 12 N. L. R. B. 136 (1939); In re Carlisle Lumber Co., 2 N.
L.R. B. 248 (1936).
11. N. L. R. B. v. New Era Dye Co., Inc.) 118 F. (2d) 500 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941).
12. The major impetus given to this theory was the suggestion of the Supreme Court
inN. L. R. B. v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 314 U. S. 469, 479 (1941) that the
Board had not found the Employer's speech coercive, "...
by reliance on the surrounding circumstances."
13. In Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. N. L. R. B., 132 F. (2d) 390, 393 (C. C. A. 4th,
1942) the court decreed enforcement of the Board's order after concluding the Board's
decision was based on the

"...

totality of the Company's activities during the period

in question. .."
14. For use of coercive background approach see In re Anderson Mfg. Co., 58 N. L. R.
B. 1511 (1944); Elastic Stop Nut Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 142 F. (2d) 371 (C. C. A. 8th,
1944); N. L. R. B. v. Stone, 125 F. (2d) 752 (C. C. A. 7th, 1942); N. L. R. B. v,Trojan Powder Co., 135 F. (2d) 337 (C. C. A. 3d, 1943).
15. Respondent was accused of unfair labor practices by discharging certain em-
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In rejecting the Board's contention that the time at which the utterances vere
made was significant of the coercive nature of the employer's conduct the Court
differed sharply with a number of Board decisions' 0 holding that factor to he material. The speech in question was delivered one week prior to the union election
and was for all practical purposes, considering the duration of the union's campaign, on the "eve" of the election. That single circumstance had previously been
held by the Board sufficiently indicative of psychological pressure to render state7
ments, otherwise innocuous, violations of the National Labor Relations Act.' The
princidown
the
broad
Court in dismissing this element of the Board's charge set
ple that the occasion on which the employer elects to utter his thoughts is not to
be considered as an element of coercion.1 s Although a holding that such a factor,
by itself, can never amount to coercive conduct would seem to be justified, it would
seem that the timing of the utterance may in a proper case still constitute one factor
among others in an entire course of coercive conduct.
The content of the speech delivered by the employer's Labor Relations ,Manager
consisted of a denunciation of the union's allegedly libelous accusations against the
Company for which a suit was then pending and statements as to the Company's
"unalterable opposition" to the closed shop. The grounds on which the court rejected the Board's condemnation of each of these utterances emphasize two valuable rules of thumb for permissible employer conduct under the Wagner Act. In sustaining the right of the employer to take reasonable efforts to shield the Company
from defamatory union statements, the Court concluded that the severity and intemperance of the union's attacks on the Company warranted action by the Company
to protect its name and defend itself.' 9
As to the employer's stated opposition to a "closed shop" the court pointed
out that the Company's representative had prefaced his remarks with a declaration that the Company would in the event of a union victory bargain collectively.
This precautionary measure may have the effect of justifying subsequent remarks as
appeals to reason rather than threats of reprisaL2 Although it is true that the Naployees. Court held as a matter of fact that the employer was justified in the dcharges.
The Board also found that the employer violated § 3(1) of the National Labor Relations
Act by certain remarks during a period of fifteen months made by certain minor supervisory employees. The court stated that in the light of the employer's dearly defined
attitude of non-interference the respondent would not be held responsible for the employee's statements.
16. In re Precision Scientific Co., 53 N. L. R. B. 860 (1943); In re Fichett-Brown
Mlfg. Co., 53 N. L. R. B. 106 (1946).
17. See In re Precision Scientific Co., 53 N. L. R. B. SCO, 863 (1943) which held that a
speech "at almost the hour of election" was coercive.
IS. In the instant case the court stated at p. 499: "The occasion on which the employer
elects to utter his thoughts is not to be considered as an element of coercion. He is as
free to speak at one time as another."
19. Ibid. The court here suggests the first rule of thumb, i.e., greater freedom is permitted the employer when he is on the iefensive. See In re Heisler, 71 N. L. R. B. 131
(1936) indicating that employer threats may be justified as a ... tactical maneuver provoked by union threats to continue a strike." In Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. N. L. R.
B., 113 F.

(2d) s5, s9 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940), the court stated that an employer is not

required to stand as a ".

.

. sheep before his shearers dumb..

2

20. This illustrates the second rule of thumb, i.e., as long as an employer states to
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tional Labor Relations Act does specifically sanction a closed shop and the Supreme
Court has recognized it as a legitimate subject of labor negotiation, 21 the Act
does not compel an employer to submit to such a demand. The employer's obligation is merely to agree to consider the question with the selected representatives
of the workers, and in the instant case the expressed willingness of the employer
to discuss the question was sufficient to avoid the charge of unfair labor practice. 2
The court's refusal to interdict the Company's expression of a policy of opposition to the "closed shop" principle seems justified on another ground as well. In
labor negotiation such a demand is usually considered the ultimate step in successful union bargaining, and the union in the subject case appeared to be scarcely on a
firm enough footing to expect the Company to capitulate.2 3
A most important issue considered by the Court involved the Board's contention that the circumstances of compulsory attendance at the employer's speeches
was a species of coercion. The reasoning of the court in rejecting that argument showed little sympathy for the once traditional "nursemaid" attitude toward
union activity 24 and was directly in conflict with the recently expressed policy of
the Board on that question. In N. L. R. B. v. Clark Brothers,25 decided just prior
to the subject case, the Board had specifically considered the factor of a so-called
"Captive Audience" as a factor in the "totality" of an employer's conduct and had
decided that it was a material element in determining the coercive effect of the employer's statements. Indeed the Chairman of the Board in commenting on the Clark
Brothers case before a convention of Industrial Relations Personnel had expressed
the view that the existence of a "Captive Audience" was in itself an unfair labor
practice. 26 It can hardly be denied that the employer, by requiring attendance at
its representative's speeches during working hours was in fact utilizing its economic
his workers that he will obey the law, he can speak more freely. N. L. R. B. v. West
Kentucky Coal Co., 152 F. (2d) 198 (C. C. A. 6th, 1945); N. L. R. B. v. Brown-Brockneyer Co., 143 F. (2d) 537 (C. C. A. 6th, 1944); N. L. R. B. v. Citizen-News Co., 134 F.
(2d) 970 (C. C. A. 9th, 1943).
21. National Licorice Co. v. N. L. R. B., 309 U. S. 350 (1940).
22. See Continental Box Co. v. N. L. R. B., 113 F. (2d) 93 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940); N.
L. R. B. v. Blossom Products Corp., 121 F. (2d) 260 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941), for instances
of judicial sympathy with a policy of opposition to a closed shop.
23. The question of outlawing the closed shop is presently being agitated in Congress.
It seems questionable, however, that Congress will outlaw the closed shop at this time.
See Timm MAGAZINE, March 3, 1947, p. 21, col. 3, for an excellent discussion of the proposed changes in the N. L. R. A.
24. For example, in International Ass'n of Machinists v. N. L. R. B., 311 U. S. 72
(1940) the Supreme Court condemned the use by an employer of "slight suggestions"
as to his choice between unions. In N. L. R. B. v. Federbush Co., 121 F. (2d) 954, 957
(C. C. A. 2d, 1941), Judge Hand, in upholding a Board order, said: ". . . what to an outsider will be no more than a vigorous presentation of a conviction, to an employee may
be the manifestation of a determination which it is not safe to thwart."
25. In re Clark Bros. Co., Inc., 70 N. L. R. B. No. 60 (1946).'
26. See Labor Relations Reporter, Vol. 19, No. 1, Analysis I, in which Mr. Paul Herzog,
Chairman of National Labor Relations Board, speaking before the Annual Convention of
the Industrial Relations Sections of Printing Industry of America, Atlantic City, N. J.,
Sept. 9, 1946, stated a "Captive Audience" would make a speech per se coercive and hoped
for an early court ruling on this question.
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position to force the employees at least to hear and become acquainted with its
viewpoint on labor policies. The court made no attempt to deny that this advantage existed or that the employer had used its position to further its interests, but
condoned the compulsory feature of the gathering as an established incident of the
constitutional right of free speech. 27 Moreover using economic position to force
workers to listen is clearly distinguishable from compelling them to act according
to the speaker's views. Threats of economic reprisal are illegal because they are an
illegitimate attempt to influence conduct. However, in the instant case the Company speeches were appeals to the workers' reason and while perhaps persuasive,
did not become coercive merely because the listeners had not freely assembled. The
very purpose of speech, freedom of which the First Amendment assures, is to influence the intellect and persuade to action. The will, however, remains free.
The significance of the Court's decision lies in its expression of a judicial attitude that has gradually developed with the coming of age of unionism. The Wagner
Act is much more than a statement of the rights of employees to organize; its provisions were admittedly molded with the purpose of fostering the growth of unionism. Sheltered by its unilateral prohibitions organized labor has increased in strength
and prestige until today it rivals the forces of capital in economic power and political influence. The decision of the Court appears to be based upon a recognition
of this fact.

TORTS-NEGLIGENcE-LIABILTY TO RESCUER WHERE DErEND.QNT IS SOLELY
RESPONSmLE TOR PERIL TO HraxsELr.-Thfs was an action for damages for personal

injuries sustained by the plaintiff while he was attempting to prevent the defendant
from being run down by her own vehicle. The defendant had started to drive down
the rather steep incline leading from her farm to the main highway when she spied
some soft drink bottles lying in her path. In order to remove them, she stopped
her car but did not apply the emergency brake or place the car in gear. While
she was engaged in removing the bottles, the car started to move down the incline.
The plaintiff, who was visiting the farm, perceiving the defendants peril, shouted
a warning, but it went unheard. He then dashed forward into the path of the moving vehicle, pushed the defendant out of harm's way, but was himself struck by the
vehicle. Held, judgment for the plaintiff affirmed on the ground that the defendant,
by parking her car as she did, exposed herself to an undue risk of injury and by so
doing was negligent towards the plaintiff in that her act caused him to undertake
her rescue, thereby exposing him to an undue risk of injury. Carney v. Buyea, App. Div. -, 65 N. Y. S. (2d) 902 (4th Dep't 1946).'
The status in the law of one seeking to recover damages for personal injuries
sustained in an attempt to rescue a third person imperiled by the negligence of'the
27. In Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U. S. 141 (1943) the Supreme Court held a
municipal ordinance invalid which attempted to protect the householder's right of prhacy.
1. This note is limited to a consideration of the rescue doctrine, so called, as applied
in this case although the defendant resisted liability on an additional ground, i.e., that,
since the plaintiff was a mere licensee on the defendant's premes at the time he incurred
his injuries, she only owed him the duty of not injuring him by her own affirmative negligence. The court found that the defendant's act was one of affirmative negligence and
that, in any event, the jury could find that plaintiff was an implied invitee.
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defendant has provided a fertile source for discussion in British as well as in Amrican 3 jurisdictions. In the absence of reckless or unreasonable conduct on the part of
the plaintiff, 4 or of conduct which contributed to the creation of the peril,5 and
so long as the peril was such as would have appeared real and imminent to a reasonable man acting under similar circumstances,' the overwhelming weight of au7
thority has refused to hold the rescuer contributorily negligent as a matter of law.
8
That there have been dissents is not to be denied. Indeed, at first blush it might
2. PoLLocK, TORTS (14th ed. 1939) 384; Goodhart, Rescue and Voluntary Assump.
tion of Risk (1934) 5 CA m. L. J. 192; Brown, A Study in Negligence (1932) 10 CAN. B.
REv. 557.
3. COOLEY, TORTS (3d ed. 1906) 1454; HARPER, TORTS (1933) 165, 278, 294; Bohlen,
Voluntary Assumption of Risk (1906) 20 H~av. L. REv. 14, 91; Note (1933) 67 U. S. L.
REv. 541.

4. In Chattanooga Light & Power Co. v. Hodges, 109 Tenn. 331, 70 S. W. 616 (1902)
the plaintiff's intestate, an employee, ran into a burning power house, negligently constructed by the employer, ,for the purpose of using a telephone therein to sound a fire
alarm. The judgment for the plaintiff was reversed on the ground that the intervening act
of the deceased, however heroic it might have been, constituted extreme rashness. Cf.
Walters v. Denver Consol. Elec. Light Co., 12 Colo. 145, 150, 151, 54 Pac. 960, 962 (1898),
"The law is not the creature of cold-blooded, merciless logic, and its inherent justice and
humanity will never for a moment permit the act of a mother in saving her offspring,
no matter how desperate it may have been, to be imputed Ito her as negligence, or at
any time, or in any manner, used to her detriment." That language has been criticized as
stating toobroad a rule. Note (1933) 67 U. S. L. REv. 541, 545; N. Y. L. J., Feb. 5,
1947, p. 490, col. 2.
5. Aft. & Coast Air Line Ry. v. Leach, 91 Ga. 419, 17 S. E. 619 (1893) ; Cf, West Chicago
St. R. R. v. Liderman, 187 Ill. 463, 58 N. E. 367 (1900) ;.Brown v. Columbia Amusement
Co., 91 Mont. 174, 6 P. (2d) 874 (1931). However, the plaintiff's recovery is not ,barred
because the negligence of the person sought to be rescued contributed to the negligence of
the defendant in the creation of the dangerous situation. Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry.
v. Lynch, 69 Ohio St. 123, 68 N. E. 703 (1903); Highland v. Wilsonian Inv. Co., 171
Wash. 34, 17 P. (2d) 631 (1932) ; IETATEM=NT, TORTS (1934) § 472, comment a.
6. "As there was no evidence tending in any degree to prove that anyone was In danger, or that Fitzpatrick, in voluntarily incurring the risk, did so to save human life, he
was not relieved from the charge of negligence. . ." levine v. Pfaelzer, 277 Ill. 255, 261,
115 N. E. 126, 128 (1917); cf. Wolfinger v. Shaw, 138 Neb. 229, 292 N. W. 731 (1940);
Manthey v. Rauenbuehler, 71 App. Div. 173, 75 N. Y. Supp. 714 (lst Dep't 1902).
7. See note 18 infra: RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 472, comment a. Contra: Anderson v. Northern Ry. (1876) 25 U. C. C. P. 301.
8. Two of the most vigorous dissenting opinions were registered in two landmark
cases: Eckert v. Long Island Ry., 43 N. Y. 502, 506 (1871) and Corbin 'v. Phil., 195 Pa.
461, 473, 45 At. 1070, 1074 (1900). A Canadian court has denied the rescuer a right
of action. In Anderson v. Northern Ry. (1876) 25 U. C. C. P. 301, the plaintiff's intestate
pushed a woman out of the path of a gravel train backing down along a track of the
defendant railroad but lost his own life as a consequence. An evenly divided court
resulted in the affirmance of a judgment for the defendant. Strong, J., in concurring with
Draper, C. J., referred to Eckert v. Long Island Ry., 43 N. Y. 502 (1871), and said at
320: ". . . the legal reasoning of the dissenting minority commends itself much more
strongly to my mind than that contained in the judgment of the Court." Burton and
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appear that a logical application of the basic rules of negligence would tend strongly
to support the view taken by the dissenting minority. In speaking of this group of
cases this minority say, ".... the maxim volenti ?wit fitinjura applies... One who
with liberty of choice, and knowledge of the hazard of injury, places himself in a
position of danger, does so at his own peril, and must take the consequences of
his act.' But, it might be inquired, has the rescuer exercised "a liberty of choice"?
Or, putting it differently, is the rescuer a volunteer in the truest sense of the word?
There is respectable and what is submitted to be well-reasoned authority for the
proposition that he is not;' 0 that he is in fact one who has reacted instinctively to
the danger threatening the life of a fellow human. However, the term "instinctively" is not to be construed in its narrowest sense so as to penalize one who has, with
the speed of thought peculiar to the human mind, calculated the risk and perhaps
weighed the cost. The narrow construction was at one time applied in England
where it was believed that recovery by the plaintiff was conditioned upon whether
his heroism had been instinctive or calculated. 11 The American courts have not
demanded spontaneous and immediate reaction on the part of him who would effect
the rescue. The late Justice Cardozo, speaking for the New York Court of App2als
in a leading case in this branch of the law, Wagner v. International Ry.,22 proPatterson, J. J., dissented, approving the Eckert case. Burton, J., was also of the opinion
that the defendant, Northern Ry., had little cause to complain "... . that the deceas-d did,
under the circumstances, venture himself to encounter some degrce of peril in an attempt
to save the woman's life, the result of which, if successful, would relieve them from responsibility." Id. at 323.
9. Eckert v. Long Island Ry., 43 N. Y. 502, 505, 506 (1371) (Allen, J., dissenting). This
case probably set the precedent for permitting rescuers to recover. In it, the plaintiff's
intestate rescued a little child from the path of an onrushing train but was himself killed
in so doing. In refusing to hold his act negligent as a matter of law, the court, speaking
through Judge Grover, uttered the words which have echoed and re-echoed through
the decisions ever since when it said at 506: "The law has so high a regard for human
life that it will not impute negligence to an effort to preserve it, unless made under such
circumstances as to constitute rashness in the judgment of prudent persons."
10. Prof. Bohlen, supra note 2, at 21, points out . . . that one who has the legal
right or legal or social duty to act as he has done under the conditions created by the defendant's wrong does not act voluntarily, his action is caused by the coercion of the
circumstances which the defendant's wrong has created." A similar sentiment is expressed by Brown, supra note 2, at 561. In United States v. Chesapeake & 0. R. R, 130 F.
(2d) 30S, 311 (C. C. A. 4th, 1942), a case involving the rescue of property, Northcott, J.,
observed that "Circumstances may be as potent in forcing action as physical force.
Action taken for the protection of property in'such circumstances is no more to be claE--d
as 'voluntary' action than payment of taxes owing by another to prevent the sale of one's
property."
11. See Brandon v. Osborne Garret & Co., Ltd. (1924) 1 K. B. 543, 555; S.Lxo.D, Toixs
(7th ed. 192S) 3S. But, in the light of ,the criticism directed towards what was termed
to be ". . . a very strange doctrine." (Haynes v. Harwood (1935) 1 K. B. 146, 164, Goodhart, supra note 2, at 202) it is at least doubtful that the English courts today would
indorse what would appear to be a condemnation of greater bravery.
12. 232 N. Y. 176, 133 N. E. 437 (1921). In this case the defendant operated an electric railway. The plaintiff's cousin had been thrown out of an open door of one of the
defendant's cars as it turned a curve, and at a point where the trestle upon which the
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pounded what is almost uniformly conceded to be the more realistic doctrine when
he said with typical eloquence that "The law does not discriminate between the
rescuer oblivious of peril and the one who counts the cost. It is enough that the act,
13
whether impulsive or deliberate, is the child of the occasion."
Nor has it been held material in the American jurisdictions that the rescuer owed

no legal duty to go to the aid of the person in danger.14 The English courts, how-

ever, had inclined towards the view that recovery was dependent upon the exist-

ence of such a duty15 but the recent case of Morgan v. Aylaen1o wherein a plaintiff
car was proceeding changed to a bridge. The plaintiff walked back along the trestle and,
while searching in darkness for his cousin's body, missed his footing and fell to the
ground beneath, thereby sustaining the injuries for which the action was brought. Held,
judgment for the defendant reversed on the ground that the reasonableness of the plaintiff
in going to the rescue, as he did, was for the jury.
13. Id. at 181, 133 N. E. at 438. But see Barnett v. Des Moines Electric Co., 10 F.
(2d) 111, 113 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925), "In the Eckert case . . . the plaintiff's intestate had
no time for deliberation. He was called upon to act instantly." And, at 114: ". . . the
courts recognize the human instinct which prompts a person to go to the rescue of another
in a position of imminent danger. . . They hold that, where one undertakes such a rescue
under circumstances which do not admit of delay or time for reflection or consideration,
he is not guilty of contributory negligence . . ." (Italics supplied). In Barnett v. Des
Moines Electric Co., supra, the court found that the children, who were twenty-five or
thirty feet removed from the live wire, were not in real and imminent danger. Interestingly enough, the court made no reference to Wagner v. Intern't'n'l Ry., 232 N. Y. 176,
133 N. E. 437 (1921).
14. That he does not owe a legal duty is well illustrated by the celebrated case of
Osterlind v. Hill, 263 Mass. 73, 76, 160 N. E. 301, 302 (1928), wherein a canoe which
had been hired from the defendant overturned. One of the canoeists hung on to the craft
for half an hour, calling for help. The defendant heard him and did nothing. In the action
brought to recover damages for his death, the court observed: "The failure of the defendant to respond to the intestate's outcries is immaterial. No legal right of the intestate
was infringed." For an interesting discussion of this line of cases, see (1933) 67 U. S. L.
REv. 541. Also see (1944) 13 FoRDnAx L. RaV. 252, 253. For a criticism of the courts'
failure to permit recovery in cases such as Osterlind v. Hill, supra, see Ames, Law and
Morals (1908) 22 HaRv. L. Rv. 97, 111, et seq. Once the rescuer has acted, the absence
of a legal duty running from him to the one in peril will not hinder his cause of action.
See note 18 infra. But see Corbin v. Phila., 195 P'a. 461, 473, 474, 45 Atl. 1070, 1074, 1075
(1900) (Mitchell, J., dissenting). However, a majority of the court in the Corbin case
affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff whose son had lost his life in an attempt to save the
life of a boy who had been overcome by gas when he went down into a hole to retrieve
a ball which had rolled into it during a ball game.
15. See Cutler v. United Dairies (1933) 2 K. B. 297, 304, 305. The soundness of the
dictum in that case was questioned again by way of dicta, by Greer, L. J., in Haynes
v. Harwood (1935) 1 K. B. 146, 156 (police constable injured in attempt to stop bolting
horses), where the Lord Justice quoted, expressly approved, and said that it represented
the law of England, the following passage from Prof. Goodhart's article, supra note 2,
at 196: "'The American rule is that the doctrine of the assumption of risk does not
apply . . . whether the person endangered is one to whom he (the rescuer) owes a duty
of protection . . . or is a mere stranger to whom he owes no such special duty.'" The
dictum just quoted was followed by the court in Morgan v. Aylen, note 16 infra, and accompanying text.
16. (1942) 1 All Eng. 489 (K. B.), 58 L. Q. REV. 299.
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was permitted to recover for injuries sustained while she was attempting to rescue
a child who was about to be struck by a motorcycle being driven at an excessive rate
of speed by the defendant, would seem to have inclined that country to the view
presently extant in our jurisdictions.
Some have attempted to defeat recovery by the would-be rescuer on the ground
that his act was a nowvus actus intervenelns17 but here, too, their objection has fallen
on deaf ears. The courts have been as one in holding that the negligence of the defendant initiated a chain of causation of which the attempted rescue was a natural
and probable consequence. s
The instant case represents a group of cases which differ in one important respect from those previously discussed.10 In this group only two parties are involved.
The defendant and the person sought to be rescued are one and the same. The
only negligence, if any there be, is that of the defendant. He has, by his failure
17. See note S supra.
IS. Rovinski v. Rowe, 131 F. (2d) 637 (C. C. A. 6th, 1942), offers a striking illustration of the extent to which the courts have gone in following the chain of causes. In
that case the defendant drove his automobile into the rear portion of a delivery truck
being driven by a nurse. Her vehicle remained on the highway. The plaintiff, a mechanic
and truck driver on his way to pick up a designated vehicle, espying the two motionlesZ
vehicles, stopped, pointed out the danger of allowing the nurse's truck to remain where
it was and consented to tow it off the road. As he was engaged in hooking a toxv-chaIn
to the front of the nurse's vehicle, a fourth vehicle crashed into the rear of the nurze's
truck, crushing the plaintiff between the two vehicles he had been attempting to hook together. Held, judgment for plaintiff affirmed, the trial court having committed no error
in submitting to the jury the question of whether or not the original collision was the
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. The observation of Sir Frederick Pollock in
his treatise on ToRTs (14th ed. 1939) 334, that ". . . the law does not think so meanly of
mankind as to hold it otherwise than a natural and probable consequence of a helpless
person being put in danger that some able-bodied peron should expose himself to the
same danger to effect a rescue.", finds support in numerous other decisions, a few of which
are: Blanchard v. Reliable Transfer Co., 71 Ga. App. S43, 32 S. E. (2d) 420 (1944)
(Parker, J., dissenting on the ground that under the unusual circumstances of that case
the injuries sustained by the plaintiff were too remote) ; Gibney v. State, 137 N. Y. 1, 33
N. E. 142 (1S93) (plaintiff permitted to recover for her husband's death sustained in his
attempt to save his child after it had fallen into a stream through an opening negligently
permitted to remain in a bridge); cf. Sann v. Johns Mfg. Co., 16 App. Div. 252, 44 N. Y.
Supp. 641 (1st Dep't 1897) ; see Gprx-,r, RAIioNzATM or Pro0mLTE CA1USE (1927) 95.
19. It is to be noted that the rescue doctrine is not limited to attempts to save human
beings. Injuries incurred in a reasonable effort to prevent the destruction of property
jeopardized by the negligence of the defendant are compensable. United States v. Chesapeake & 0. R. R., 130 F. ((2d) 30S (C. C. A. 4th, 1942). Cont ra: Logan v. Wabash
R. R., 96 Mo. App. 461, 70 S. W. 734 (1902); see Eckert v. Long Island Ry., 43 N. Y.
502, 506 (1871). The dictum in the Eckert case would seem not to state the law prezsently
in force in New York. Rexter v. Starin, 73 N. Y. 601 (1878). The attempt to rescue
need not be made by the owner of the property. Liming v. Ill. Cent. R. R., 81 Iowa 246,
47 N. W. 66 (1S90). Contra: Cook v. Johnston, 58 Mich. 437, 25 N. W. 383 (1895). As
might reasonably be expected, the reasonableness of the plaintiff in exposing himself to
the peril is subjected to a more severe test in this group of cases than it is in the group
where it is sought to effect the rescue of a person. Cook v. Johnston, supra.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol, 16

to exercise reasonable care for his own safety, placed himself in the perilous position from which the plaintiff has sought to rescue him. There is a dearth of authority upon this precise point,20 and, as the court observed in the principal case,
it appears to be the first time that such facts have been before a New York court.
The few decisions in other jurisdictions are neither harmonious nor reconcilable.
In the case of Saylor v. Parsons,21 relied upon by the defendant in the principal case,
the plaintiff was injured when, in carrying out his duties as an employee in removing
a structure, he threw the prop supporting his side of the wall against the top of the
wall which appeared to be toppling upon the defendant Parsons, who was oversee.
ing the work. The latter was saved but the plaintiff sustained severe personal injuries when his wall caved in upon him. He brought his action against the defendant Parsons individually and against the employer. The Iowa court, in denying recovery to the plaintiff, held that Parsons had violated no legal duty in placing
himself in a position of danger; and since the employer had not been negligent as
to him, it could not have been negligent as to his rescuer. The court appears to
have based its decision upon a finding that the person rescued (Parsons) did not
anticipate, nor would a person of ordinary diligence have anticipated, that one (the
plaintiff) working under him would come to rescue him from the perilous situation into which he had placed himself.22 It is submitted that the court's ruling of
lack of negligence as a matter of law was error . Without going so far as to say
that the defendant Parsons, should, as a matter of law, have anticipated both the
peril and rescue, it would appear to have been at least a question of fact for the jury.
In Brugh v.,Bigelow 23 the defendant had placed himself in a position of danger
through his negligent operation of an automobile. Plaintiff, a passer-by, responded
to the defendant's cries for assistance and was injured in her attempt to extricate
him from his predicament. A unanimous court reversed a judgment dismissing
the plaintiff's action.
The English courts have not passed upon this precise point but a noted writer
20. Brugh v. Bigelow, 310 Mich. 74, 16 N. W. (2d) 668 (1944); cf. Butler v. Jersey
Coast News Co., 109 N. J. L. 255, 160 Atl. 659 (1932); see BonL_, STUDIEs IN THE LAW
or ToRTs (1926) 569 n. 33. Contra: Saylor v. Parsons, 122 Iowa 679, 98 N. W. 500 (1904);
see Alabama Power Co. v. Conine, 213 Ala. 228, 229, 104 So. 535, 537 (1925). In Butler v.
Jersey Coast News Co., supra, the plaintiff had been severely burned by charged wires encountered while going to the assistance of the driver of the defendant's truck. The court
affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff but stated that the case did not come within the class of
cases known as rescue cases since, in so far as appeared, therb was nothing necessarily and
obviously to suggest danger.
21. 122 Iowa 679, 98 N. W. 500 (1904).
22. Id. at 684, 98 N. W. at 502. During the course of his opinion Ladd, J., observed:
"Where no one else is concerned, the individual may incur dangers and risks as he may
choose, and in doing so he violates no legal duty." (Italics supplied). Id. at 683, 98 N. W.
at 502. It has been argued that someone else is concerned, i.e., the rescuer. (1945) 43
MIcr. L. REsv. 980, 982.
23. 310 Mich. 74, 16 N. W. (2d) 668 (1944). Reid, J., in speaking for the court,
distinguished Saylor v. Parsons on the ground that in the latter case the plaintiff exposed
himself to injury on private property where the safety of others would not necessarily be
involved, while in the Brugh case the plaintiff was proceeding on a public highway. Id.
at 76, 16 N. W. (2d) at 671. The extreme tenuousness of such a distinction has been
noted. (1945) 10 Mo. L. REv. 321, 324.
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has recommended that on principle they ought to permit the plaintiff to recover
even in this group of cases since it is the defendant's act "...
which has induced
the rescuer to incur the danger."2 4
There is no gainsaying that the result reached in the instant case is eminently just
since the defendant is being made to do that which in all decency she should have
done without compelling plaintiff to resort to a lawsuit. But, apart from any moral
obligation to make indemnification, can the decision be justified on any purely
legal ground?- Is the result a logical application of the rescue doctrine as applied
to those situations involving three persons wherein the negligence of the defendant
towards the person imperiled has been deemed to be the proximate cause of the
injury to the plaintiff? The difficulty in that line of cases is to find a legal duty to
refrain from forseeable harm owed by the defendant to the rescuer. There is, in
those cases, considerable language that ".. . the negligence of the company (defendant), as to the person in danger, is imputed to the company with respect
to him who attempts the rescue. .. "2G If, as has apparently been assumed by some
courts, this language means that the basis of the defendant's negligence with respect
to the person imperiled is the same basis upon which is predicated the defendant's
liability to the plaintiff-rescuer, the language states an erroneous principle of law.
The real ground of such defendant's liability to the rescuer is the tendency of the
defendant's act to cause the rescuer to imperil himself.2 7 Indeed, this would seem
to be what was intended by the use of the quoted language, i.e., if the defendant
is negligent as to the person imperiled, he will in most cases be negligent as to
the rescuer.28 If the above-quoted language from the case involving three persons
be, as erroneously interpreted, applied to the situations involving only the rescued
person and his rescuer (the principal case), it might be contended that, since the
rescued person is legally incapable of being negligent towards himself, he is not
24. (1942) 5S L. Q. Rm. 299, 300.
25. The term "purely" is used advisedly in the light of statements such as that made
by Professor Bohlen, in his article, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Ba-is of Tort
Liability (190S) 56 U. or PA. L. REv. 217, 289, 335, where he said: "And it may, perhaps, even be suggested that after all what are now regarded as legal duties as distinguished
from moral and ethical duties, merely embody the crude conceptions on such points
prevalent at that early stage of national civilization and social development when the
King's Court took over its keeping, and undertook the task of enforcing the common or
customary law of England." Also see Allen, Legal Duties (1931) 40 YAt= L. J. 331, 377
et seq.
26. Donahue v. W., St. L. & P. Ry., 33 Mo. 560, 564 (1834), quoted apparently with
approval in Saylor v. Parsons, 122 Iowa 679, 681, 6S3, 93 N. W. 500, 501, 502 (IS4),
and its substance approved in Corbin v. Phila., 195 Pa. 461, 471, 45 Ad. 1070, 1074 (150).
Similar language has been in evidence in other cases. . ..it is enough to hold the defendant if there was negligence on its part toward either Coombs (per-on imperilcd) or
the plaintiff. ' (Italics supplied). Dixon v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R., 207 Mass. 126, 131,
92 N. E. 1030, 1031 (1910). Note writers have adopted the language. ". .. it is sufficient
that the defendant was negligent toward the person whose life was imperiled . . !" Note
(1933) 67 U. S. L. Ray. 541, 547.
27.

BoBm=,

Srumyrs 3N Ta

LAw or ToRTs (1920)

569 n. 33.

28. It is conceivable that, if the possibility of a rescue is extremely remote and entirely unforeseeable, the defendant will not be liable to the rescuer even though he may be
liable to the person rescued.
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negligent as to his rescuer. However, the sole basis of the rescued person's lia-

bility to his rescuer is not merely that the former has imperiled himself but further
that he should have foreseen that his perilous situation would call forth the rescue.
It is submitted that the principle of law underlying the two types of situations
discussed above--those involving three persons and those involving only two persons2-is identical. The sole difference between the two situations is one of fact:
in one case a third person imperils the rescued person; in the other, the rescued
person imperils himself.
29. There may also be included the cases involving danger to property. See note
19 supra.

